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a b s t r a c t 
Cyber-physical systems are integrations of computation, networking, and physical processes. Due to the 
tight cyber-physical coupling and to the potentially disrupting consequences of failures, security here is 
one of the primary concerns. Our systematic mapping study sheds light on how security is actually ad- 
dressed when dealing with cyber-physical systems from an automatic control perspective. The provided 
map of 138 selected studies is defined empirically and is based on, for instance, application fields, vari- 
ous system components, related algorithms and models, attacks characteristics and defense strategies. It 
presents a powerful comparison framework for existing and future research on this hot topic, important 
for both industry and academia. 
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t  1. Introduction 
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are integrations of computation,
networking, and physical processes ( Lee and Seshia, 2015; Cárde-
nas et al., 2008a ). The key characteristic of cyber-physical systems
is their seamless integration of both hardware and software re-
sources for computational, communication and control purposes,
all of them co-designed with the physical engineered components
( Poovendran, 2010 ). 
The economic and societal potential of cyber-physical systems
is astonishing, and major investments are being made worldwide
to develop the technology. For instance, the December 2010 re-
port of the U.S. President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology ( Holdren et al., 2010 ) called for continued investment
in CPS research because of its scientific and technological impor-
tance as well as its potential impact on grand challenges in a
number of sectors critical to U.S. security and competitiveness, in-
cluding aerospace, automotive, chemical production, civil infras-
tructure, energy, healthcare, manufacturing, materials and trans-
portation. Also, the anticipated funding to research and education
projects on CPS amounts to approximately $34,0 0 0,0 0 0 each year∗ Corresponding authors. 
E-mail addresses: yuriy.zacchialun@imtlucca.it (Y. Zacchia Lun), 
i.malavolta@vu.nl (I. Malavolta). 
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jss.2018.12.006 
0164-1212/© 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.  NSF, 2016 ), and the European Union has a similar vision on the
mportance of research on CPS ( Allocca and Wavering, 2013 ). 
Applications of CPS arguably have the potential to dwarf the
0-th century IT revolution ( Lee and Seshia, 2015 ). Among the
any applications of CPS we can find high confidence medical de-
ices and systems, assisted living, traffic control and safety, ad-
anced automotive systems, process control, energy conservation,
nvironmental control, avionics, instrumentation, critical infras-
ructure control (electric power, water resources, and communi-
ations systems for example), distributed robotics (telepresence,
elemedicine), defense, manufacturing, smart structures, etc. 
It goes without saying that in this type of systems security is a
rimary concern and, because of the tight cyber-physical coupling,
t is one of the main scientific challenges. Indeed, CPS security is
ttracting several research efforts from different and independent
reas (e.g., secure control, intrusion detection in SCADA systems,
tc.), each of them with specific peculiarities, features, and capa-
ilities. 
However, if on one side having many research efforts from dif-
erent and independent areas on CPS security confirms its impor-
ance from a scientific point of view, on the other side it is very
ifficult to have a holistic view on this important domain. Un-
er this perspective, even if the progress of research on cyber-
hysical systems has started more than ten years ago and the var-
ous research communities are very active, the trends, characteris-
ics, and the validation strategies of existing research on CPS secu-
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S  
o  ity are still unclear . With this work we aim at filling this gap.
PS security is presently investigated in a number of scientific (e.g.
n Embedded Systems and Wireless Sensor Networks) communi-
ies from different points of view. In this paper we focus on re-
earch on CPS security from the point of view of the Automatic
ontrol scientific community. A first motivation for our choice is
hat most application domains where CPS security is an issue con-
ist of/include distributed feedback-based automation systems. In
ddition to this, a peculiar characteristic of the Automatic Con-
rol research is the attempt to combine in a unifying mathematical
ramework physical components (e.g. electrical/electronic devices,
ehicles, and industrial automation machineries) and cyber compo-
ents (e.g. SCADA systems, communication protocols, and real-time
oftware) of the CPS, as well as to define rigorous performance and
obustness/resilience metrics on security properties based on such
nifying mathematical framework. 
The goal of this work is to identify, classify, and analyze exist-
ng research on CPS security from an automatic control perspec-
ive in order to better understand how security is actually ad-
ressed when dealing with CPS. In particular, we are interested in
he works proposing methods or techniques for security enforcing
r breaching in cyber-physical realm. Under this requirement, the
tudies that do not consider a physical phenomenon of interest, or
ely only on the typical IT security practices such as classical en-
ryption, are excluded. 
In order to tackle our goal we applied a well-established
ethodology from the Medical and Software Engineering research
ommunities called systematic mapping ( Petersen et al., 2015;
itchenham and Charters, 2007 ) (see Section 2.3 ), applying it on
he peer reviewed papers which propose and validate a method or
echnique for CPS security enforcing or breaching. Through our sys-
ematic mapping process, we selected 138 primary studies among
lmost three thousand entries fitting at best three research ques-
ions we identified (see Section 3.2 ). Then, we defined a classifi-
ation framework composed of more than 40 different parameters
or comparing state-of-the-art approaches, and we applied it to all
elected studies. Finally, we analyzed and discussed the obtained
ata for extracting emergent research challenges and implications
or future research on CPS security. The main contributions of this
tudy are: 
• A systematic review of current methods and techniques in auto-
matic control for CPS security, useful for both researchers and
practitioners since it is not biased from personal experience; in
particular, it considers all the studies of the field of interest, not
only the known ones, searched with a validated search method,
and selects those proposing technical solutions for security en-
forcing or breaching that are based on automatic control; 
• A reusable comparison framework for understanding, classifying,
and comparing methods or techniques for CPS security from an
automatic control perspective; 
• A discussion of emerging research challenges and implications for
future research, that is based on both the empirical results of a
systematic mapping within a time span of the first ten years of
the field, and the examination of the trends in research on CPS
security that have arisen after 2015. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first sys-
ematic investigation into the state of the art of research on CPS
ecurity from an automatic control perspective. The results of this
tudy provide a complete, comprehensive and replicable picture of
he state of the art of research on CPS security, helping researchers
nd practitioners in finding trends, characteristics, and validation
trategies of current research on security-aware cyber-physical (co-
design, intrusion detection, forecast and response, and its fu-
ure potential and applicability. The provided map presents sev-
ral characteristics of security of cyber-physical systems that re-earchers from Automatic Control community care about. In addi-
ion to scientists and practitioners from the same community, this
urvey is useful also to researchers from the different communities
lso working on cyber-physical systems, since it permits to better
nderstand the concerns that are complementary to their field of
nterest, opening the possibilities to find a common ground in an
asier way. Thanks to the mapping of each feature to the related
tudies presented explicitly, an interested reader can find immedi-
tely the reference to the works of interest. 
The main findings of our systematic analysis are discussed be-
ow: 
Publication trends : in the last years there is an increasing need
nd scientific interest on CPS security, especially on the methods
nd techniques for security enforcing and breaching. The research
n security in the cyber-physical domain is turning more and more
nto a mature field, with more foundational and comprehensive
tudies published in the recent years. This research area has a very
ultidisciplinary nature and it has been broadly considered by sci-
ntists with different research interests, such as smart grid, au-
omatic control, communications, networked systems, parallel and
istributed systems, etc. 
Characteristics and focus : the bulk of the works on CPS secu-
ity is focused on power grids, while somehow surprisingly, we
ave not found any work on the cyber-physical security of medical
PS, and only a small part of selected papers is within the appli-
ation field of secure control of (unmanned) ground vehicles and
erial systems, and of heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning in
arge functional buildings. All the works considered in this map-
ing study deal with attacks, in order to either implement or to
ounteract them: putting together all this studies gives us the pos-
ibility to categorize the existing (cyber-physical) attack models.
he defense strategies are presented in most of the studies, oc-
upying the central spot of the research efforts on CPS security.
he vast majority of the works (89.9%) is concerned with system
ntegrity, threatened by various types of deception attacks. Regard-
ng the considered system components, the approaches considering
ttacks on sensors and their protection completely dominate the
cene; in fact the resilient state estimation (SE) under measure-
ent attacks is a very active research topic within the area of CPS
ecurity. Somehow unexpectedly, very few papers consider com-
unication aspects or imperfections and attempt to provide non-
rivial mathematical models of the communication; the centralized
chemes dominate both attack and defense solutions. 
Validation strategies : most advanced and realistic validation
ethods have been exploited in the power networks application
omain, but even there a benchmark is still missing. Even if the
epeatability process, capturing how a third party may reproduce
he validation results of the method or technique, is recognized as
 good scientific practice, we found no studies providing a replica-
ion package. So, we put a particular attention on analysis and de-
cription of standard test systems and experimental testbeds used
y researchers studying various aspects of CPS security. 
By presenting and discussing the above mentioned results we
re the first to provide a complete, comprehensive and unbiased
verview of the state of the art of research in CPS security from
n automatic control perspective, thus our work can certainly be
seful for both researchers (either young or experienced ones) and
ractitioners in the field of CPS security. Finally, we use the results
f the systematic part of this study for examining the last trends in
he field and discussing potential implications for future research
n automatic control for CPS security. 
Article outline . The article is organized as follows. In
ection 2 we provide background notions for setting the context
f our study. Section 3 describes in details our research method-
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ology in designing, conducting, and documenting the study 1 , fol-
lowed by a discussion of the obtained results in Sections 4, 5 and
6 . We discuss the implications for future research on CPS security
in Section 7 , and related work in Section 8 . Section 9 closes the
article. 
In Appendix A we discuss some additional characteristics of
our primary studies, which are not related to CPS security per se,
but are still useful to better understand this scientific area. Finally,
Appendix B describes limitations and threats to validity of our re-
sults. 
2. Background 
2.1. Cyber-physical systems 
The term cyber-physical systems emerged around 2006, when
it was coined at the National Science Foundation (NSF) ( Lee and
Seshia, 2015 ), with the “cyber” part of the name resulting from
the term “cybernetics”, introduced as metaphor apt for control
systems. Nowadays, CPS can be seen as a family of control sys-
tems related to the domain of embedded sensor and actuator net-
works ( Cárdenas et al., 2008a ), thus close relative of Process Con-
trol Systems (PCS) and of Supervisory Control And Data Acquisi-
tion (SCADA) systems. However, the seamless integration of com-
putational, communication and control resources, co-designed to-
gether with physical engineered components ( Allocca and Waver-
ing, 2013 ) is what sets CPS discipline apart ( Poovendran, 2010 ). 
2.2. Security of CPS 
Uncertainty in the environment, security attacks, and errors in
physical devices make ensuring overall system security a critical
challenge for CPS ( Rajkumar et al., 2010 ). Furthermore, a cyber-
physical coupling allows sophisticated adversaries to perform at-
tacks threatening also other key attributes of the system, first and
foremost safety ( Koscher et al., 2010; Chen and Abu-Nimeh, 2011 ).
This is the reason why, among several crucial requirements of CPS,
today many researchers are interested in various (unique) aspects
of CPS security; for example investigating on combined cyber-
physical attack models ( Teixeira et al., 2015b ), and on attack de-
tection and identification monitors ( Pasqualetti et al., 2013 ). 
CPS security presents a number of peculiar characteristics
that distinguish it from more conventional IT systems security
( Stouffer et al., 2015a ). For instance, with cyber-physical systems
we have real-time requirements, where response is time-critical,
modest throughput is acceptable, high delay and/or jitter is not
tolerable, and response to human or other emergency interaction
is essential. Such systems are often resource-constrained and may
not tolerate typical IT security practices. Even the usual definition
of security as the combination of three primary security attributes
of confidentiality, integrity and availability ( Avižienis et al., 2004 )
assumes for the CPS a completely new meaning ( Cárdenas et al.,
2008b ). Given that the estimation and control algorithms used
in CPS are designed to satisfy certain operational goals , such as,
closed-loop stability, safety, liveness, or the optimization of a per-
formance function, availability in CPS can be viewed as the abil-
ity to maintain the operational goals by preventing or surviving
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks to the information collected by the
sensor networks, the commands given by the controllers, and the
physical actions taken by the actuators. Similarly, CPS integrity aims
to maintain the operational goals by preventing, detecting, or sur-
viving deception attacks in the information sent and received by1 Readers mainly interested in the results of our study and future research di- 
rections may directly jump to subsequent sections and come back to this section 
afterwards. 
 
v  he sensors, the controllers, and the actuators. The intent of confi-
entiality in cyber-physical systems is to prevent an adversary from
nferring the state of the physical system by eavesdropping on the
ommunication channels between the sensors and the controller,
nd between the controller and the actuator or by means of side
hannel attacks ( Tiri, 2007 ) on sensors, controllers and actuators. 
.3. Systematic mapping studies 
A systematic mapping study (or scoping study) is a research
ethodology particularly intended to provide an unbiased, objec-
ive and systematic instrument to answer a set of research ques-
ions by finding all of the relevant research outcomes in a specific
esearch area (CPS security in our paper) ( Petersen et al., 2015 ).
esearch questions of mapping studies are designed to provide an
verview of a research area by classifying and counting research
ontributions in relation to a set of well-defined categories such
s publication type, forum, frequency, assumptions made, followed
esearch method, etc. ( Kitchenham and Charters, 2007; Petersen
t al., 2008a ). The mapping process involves searching and ana-
yzing the literature in order to identify, classify, and understand
xisting research on a specific topic of interest. 
In the recent years many researchers are conducting systematic
apping studies on a number of areas and using different guide-
ines or methods (e.g., on technical debt ( Li et al., 2015b ), search-
ase software engineering ( Lopez-Herrejon et al., 2015 ), model-
riven engineering for wireless sensor networks ( Malavolta and
uccini, 2014 )). In a recent study ( Petersen et al., 2015 ) it
merged that at least ten different guidelines have been pro-
osed for designing the systematic mapping process. We con-
ucted our study by considering the two most commonly accepted
nd followed guidelines according to Petersen et al. (2015) , specif-
cally: the ones proposed by Kitchenham and Charters (2007) and
etersen et al. (2008a) , respectively. Also, we refined our map-
ing process according to the results of a consolidating update
n how to conduct systematic mapping studies proposed by
etersen et al. (2015) . Finally, due to the various specificities of ex-
sting research on CPS (e.g., the presence of many different defini-
ions of CPS, the intrinsic multidisciplinarity of existing research
n CPS, etc.), we found it appropriate to tailor the method and
lassification schemes proposed in the guidelines according to our
opic. The method we followed in our systematic study is detailed
n Section 3 . 
.4. The need for a systematic mapping study on security for CPS 
As it was outlined in the introduction, there is a lack of sys-
ematic studies on CPS security. In order to ground this claim and
stablishing the need for performing a mapping study on security
or cyber-physical systems, we searched a set of electronic data
ources (i.e., those listed in Section 3.3 ), for systematic studies on
ecurity-aware cyber-physical co-design, self-protection and related
ecurity mechanisms specific to CPS 2 without any success. None of
he retrieved publications was related to any of our research ques-
ions detailed in Section 3.2 . So, we can claim that our research
omplements the related works described in Section 8 to investi-
ate the state-of-research about CPS security. 
. Method 
The process we followed for carrying on our study can be di-
ided into three main phases, which are the well-accepted ones2 Search performed on January 5, 2015. 
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Table 1 
Goal of this study. 
Purpose Analyze the 
Issue publication trends, characteristics, and validation strategies 
Object of existing methods and techniques for CPS security 
Viewpoint from a researcher’s point of view. 
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t  or performing a systematic study ( Kitchenham and Charters, 2007;
ohlin et al., 2012 ): planning, conducting, and documenting. In
rder to mitigate potential threats to validity, some produced ar-
ifacts in each phase have been circulated to external experts for
ndependent review. One systematic literature review (SLR) expert
nd two experts of CPS security reviewed our review protocol and
nal report independently and we refined them according to their
eedback. 
.1. Main phases of systematic survey 
In the following we will go through each phase of the process,
ighlighting its main activities and produced artifacts. 
.1.1. Planning 
In this phase we identified the main research questions (see
ection 3.2 ) and we produced a well-defined review protocol de-
cribing in details the various steps of our study. The final version
f the review protocol is publicly available as part of the replica-
ion package of this study 3 . 
.1.2. Conducting 
In this phase we set the previously defined protocol into prac-
ice. More specifically, we performed the following activities: 
• Studies search : we performed a combination of techniques for
identifying the comprehensive set of candidate entries on auto-
matic control for CPS security (see Section 3.3 ). 
• Studies selection : we filtered candidate entries in order to ob-
tain the final list of primary studies to be considered in later
activities of the review (see Section 3.3 ). 
• Comparison framework definition : we defined the set of param-
eters for comparing the primary studies. The main outcome of
this activity is a document explaining the possible values and
the meaning of each parameter (see Section 3.5 ). 
• Data extraction : we went into the details of each primary study
and extracted data according to the comparison framework de-
fined in the previous activity (see Section 3.5 ). 
• Data synthesis : we elaborated on the extracted data in order
to address each research question of our study. This activity
involved both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the ex-
tracted data (see Section 3.6 ). 
.1.3. Documenting 
The main activities performed in this phase are: (i) a thorough
laboration on the data extracted in the previous phase with the
ain aim at setting the obtained results in their context, (ii) the
nalysis of possible threats to validity, and (iii) the writing of a
et of reports describing the performed mapping study to different
udiences. Produced reports have been evaluated by SLR- and CPS-
xperts (this article itself is an instance of produced final report). 
.2. Research questions 
It is fundamental to clearly define the research questions of a
ystematic literature study ( Brereton et al., 2007 ). Before going into
he details of the identified research questions, we formulate the
oal of this research by using the Goal-Question-Metric perspec-
ives (i.e., purpose, issue, object, viewpoint ( Basili et al., 1994 )).
able 1 shows the result of the formulation mentioned above. 
The goal presented above can be refined into the following
ain research questions. For each research question we also pro-
ide its primary objective of investigation. The research questions
f this study are: 3 Replication package of this study: http://www.cs.gssi.infn.it/CPSSecurity . 
t  
Q  
t
• RQ1 - What are the publication trends of research studies on au-
tomatic control for CPS security? 
Objective: to classify primary studies in order to assess interest,
relevant venues, and contribution types. 
• RQ2 - What are the characteristics and focus of existing research
on automatic control for CPS security? 
Objective: to analyze and classify all the existing approaches for
automatic control for CPS security with respect to the specific
concerns they want to address (e.g., cyber and physical security,
secure control, model-based intrusion detection, or any combi-
nation of them). 
• RQ3 - What are the validation strategies of existing approaches for
automatic control for CPS security? 
Objective: to analyze and classify all the existing approaches for
automatic control for CPS security with respect to the strategies
used for assessing their validity (e.g., controlled experiment, in-
dustrial application, prototype-based experiment, test bed, sim-
ple examples, formal proofs). 
Answer to RQ1 gives a detailed overview about publication
rends, venues, and research groups active on the topic. The classi-
cation resulting from our investigation on RQ2 and RQ3 provides
 solid foundation for a thorough comparison of existing and fu-
ure solutions for CPS security via automatic control. These contri-
utions are especially useful for researchers willing to further con-
ribute this research area with new approaches to CPS security or
illing to better understand or refine existing ones. 
.3. Search strategy 
In order to achieve maximal coverage, our search strategy con-
ists of three complementary methods: an automatic search, man-
al search, and snowballing. Fig. 1 shows the details about our
earch strategy, and a detailed description of our application of the
forementioned methods is described in the following. 
.3.1. Automatic search 
It refers to the execution of a search query on a set of electronic
atabases and indexing systems, in the literature it is the dominant
ethod for identifying potentially relevant papers ( Chen et al.,
010 ). The applied search string is the following: 
((((’’cyber physical’’ OR ’’cyber-physical’’ 
R cyberphysical OR ’’networked control’’) AND 
ystem ∗) OR CPS OR NCS) AND (attack ∗ OR secur ∗
R protect ∗)) 
In the spirit of Zhang et al. (2011a) , we established a quasi-gold
tandard (QGS) for creating a good search string for the automatic
earch. This procedure requires a manual search in a small number
f venues (see Table 2 ) and the results of these manual searches
ave been treated as a QGS by cross-checking the results obtained
rom the automatic search. So we iteratively defined and refined
he search string, and conducted automatic searches on the elec-
ronic data sources until the quasi-sensitivity was above the estab-
ished threshold of 80%. When the quasi-sensitivity became greater
han 80%, the search performance was considered acceptable and
he results from the automated search have been merged with the
GS. The details of the above mentioned process are provided in
he replication package of this study. 
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Fig. 1. Overview of the search and selection process. 
Table 2 
Selected venues for manual search. 
Venue Publisher 
International Conference on High Confidence Networked Systems (HiCoNS) ACM 
International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (IJCIP) Elsevier 
International Symposium on Resilient Control Systems (ISRCS) IEEE 
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In this stage it was fundamental to select papers objectively
so, following the suggestions from Wohlin et al. (2012) , two re-
searchers assessed a random sample of the studies and the inter-
researcher agreement has been measured using the Cohen Kappa
statistic ( Cohen, 1968 ). Each disagreement has been discussed and
resolved, with the intervention of the team administrator, if nec-
essary, until the Cohen Kappa statistic reached a result above or
equal to 0.80. 
Our automatic search is performed on the largest and most
complete scientific databases and indexing systems available in
computer science (see the leftmost part of Fig. 1 ). The selection
of these electronic databases and indexing systems is guided also
by their high accessibility and their ability to export search results
to well-defined formats. 
Among the results of the automatic searches we removed a set
of false positives in order to work on a polished set of potentially
relevant studies (see Fig. 1 ). Examples of false positives include
proceedings of conferences or workshops, tables of contents, maps,
lists of program committee members, keynotes, tutorial or invited
talks, and messages from (co-)chairs. As shown in Fig. 1 , our auto-
matic search resulted in 2543 potentially relevant studies. 
3.3.2. Manual search 
By following the quasi-gold standard procedure defined in
Zhang et al. (2011a) , we (i) identified a subset of important venues
for the domain of cyber-physical systems security (they are shown
in Table 2 ), and (ii) performed a manual search of relevant publica-
tions in those venues. The search have been performed by consid-
ering title and abstract of each publication and the considered time
interval is between December 2008 and November 2014 (since the
earliest of above mentioned venues dates back to December 2008).
By referring to Fig. 1 , we manually searched and selected 289 po-
tentially relevant studies. After merging all the studies and removing duplicates we ob-
ained 2828 potentially relevant studies. In order to further restrict
he number of studies to be considered during the snowballing ac-
ivity, we applied the selection process depicted in Section 3.4 to
he current set of studies, thus obtaining 92 potentially relevant
tudies. In order to handle studies selection in a cost effective way
e used the adaptive reading depth, as the full-text reading of
learly excluded approaches is unnecessary. So, we considered ti-
le, keywords and abstract of each potentially relevant study and, if
election decision could not be made, other information (like con-
lusion or even full-text ) have been exploited ( Zhang et al., 2011a ). 
.3.3. Snowballing 
We applied the snowballing technique for identifying additional
ources published in other journals or venues ( Greenhalgh and
eacock, 2005 ), which may not have been considered during the
utomatic and manual searches. So, as recommended in Jalali and
ohlin (2012) , we applied (backward and forward) snowballing
n the primary studies selected by the automatic and manual
earches. More specifically, we considered all the studies selected
y the automatic and manual searches, and we searched all the
apers referring them (i.e., forward snowballing ( Wohlin, 2014 ));
hen, we scrutinized also the references of each selected study to
dentify important studies that might have been missed during the
nitial search (i.e., backward snowballing ( Wohlin, 2014 )). 
.4. Selection strategy 
As recommended in the guidelines for performing SLRs from
itchenham and Charters (2007) , we considered all the collected
tudies and filtered them according to a set of well-defined inclu-
ion and exclusion criteria. In the following we provide the inclu-
ion (I) and exclusion (E) criteria of our study: 
• I1: Studies focusing on security of cyber-physical systems. 
Y. Zacchia Lun, A. D’Innocenzo and F. Smarra et al. / The Journal of Systems and Software 149 (2019) 174–216 179 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s  
I  
b  
b  
p  
s  
o  
w  
h  
fi  
s  
i  
f  
f  
t
 
m  
w  
b  
F
 
p  
b  
r  
a  
t  
T  
d
3
 
f  
s  
m  
s  
m
 
s  
a  
t  
A  
d  
f  
m  
v  
a  
e  
c  
a  
d  
e
 
w  
c  
T  
r  
i  
f  
f  
t  
C  
m  
(  
t  
s  
b  
t  
f  
s  
i  
t  
s  
fi  
d
3
 
a  
s  
p  
t  
s
 
o  
n  
t  
t  
e
 
k  
p  
a  
t  
c  
t  
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
• I2: Studies proposing a method or technique for CPS security
enforcing or breaching based on automatic control. 
• I3: Studies providing some kind of validation of the proposed
method or technique (e.g., via formal analysis, controlled exper-
iment, exploitation in industry, example usage). 
• E1: Studies not subject to peer review ( Wohlin et al., 2012 ) (e.g.,
journal papers are considered, whereas white papers are dis-
carded). 
• E2: Studies written in any language other than English. 
• E3: Studies focusing on security method or technique not spe-
cific to CPS (e.g., studies focusing on either the physical or cy-
ber part only of the system under consideration; under this cri-
terion the studies that do not consider a physical phenomenon
of interest, sometimes called the “plant”, or rely only on the
typical IT security practices such as classical encryption, are ex-
cluded. See Halperin et al. (2008) , Zhang et al. (2011b) , and
Muradore and Quaglia (2015) as examples of notable research
papers excluded by this criterion). 
• E4: Studies published before 2006 (since the CPS discipline has
emerged in 2006). 
• E5: Secondary or tertiary studies (e.g., SLRs, surveys, etc.). 
• E6: Studies in the form of tutorial papers, short papers, poster
papers, editorials, because they do not provide enough informa-
tion. 
A study was selected as a primary study if it satisfied all inclu-
ion criteria, and it was discarded if it met any exclusion criterion.
n order to reduce bias, the selection criteria of this study have
een decided during the review protocol definition (thus they have
een checked by three external reviewers). By following the ap-
roach proposed in Ali and Petersen (2014) , two researchers clas-
ified each potentially relevant study either as relevant, uncertain ,
r irrelevant ; studies classified as irrelevant have been excluded,
hereas all the other approaches have been discussed with the
elp of a third researcher. For each potentially relevant study we
rstly analysed it by considering its title, keywords, and abstract;
econdly, if the analysis did not result in a clear decision, also its
ntroduction and conclusions have been analysed; finally, we per-
ormed a comprehensive third manual step in which we read the
ull text of all considered studies (title, abstract, keywords, all sec-
ions and appendices, if any) in order to take a final decision. 
When reading a primary study in details for extracting its infor-
ation, researchers could agree that the currently analyzed study
as semantically out of the scope of our research, and so it has
een excluded (see the Exclusion during Data Extraction stage in
ig. 1 ), resulting in 235 potentially primary studies. 
As suggested in Wohlin et al. (2012) , if a primary study was
ublished in more then one paper (e.g., if a conference paper has
een extended to a journal version) then we considered only one
eference paper as primary study; in those cases we considered
ll the related papers during the data extraction activity in order
o obtain all the necessary data ( Kitchenham and Charters, 2007 ).
he final set of primary studies is composed of 138 entries after a
uplicates merging step. 
.5. Data extraction 
Data extraction refers to the recording of all the relevant in-
ormation from the primary studies required to answer the re-
earch questions ( Wohlin et al., 2012 ). Before analysing each pri-
ary study, we defined a comparison framework for classifying re-
earch studies on cyber-physical systems security from an auto-
atic control perspective. 
To help the definition of a sound and complete compari-
on framework, we selected and adapted suitable dimensions
nd properties found in existing surveys and taxonomies relatedo CPS security, such as those proposed in Yuan et al. (2014) ;
vižienis et al. (2004) ; Yampolskiy et al. (2013) . In addition, we
efined several parameters for classifying methods and techniques
or CPS security; we grouped those parameters into three main di-
ensions: method or technique’s positioning, characterization, and
alidation. The Positioning dimension characterizes the objectives
nd intent of existing research on CPS security (the WHAT aspect of
ach method or technique). The Characterization dimension con-
erns the classification of studies based on HOW CPS security is
ddressed in research on automatic control. Finally, the Validation
imension concerns the strategies researchers apply for providing
vidence about the validity of proposed methods or techniques. 
All the dimensions and parameters of our classification frame-
ork have been encoded in a dedicated data extraction form , which
an be seen as the implementation of a comparison framework .
he data extraction form is composed of a list of attributes rep-
esenting the set of data items extracted from the primary stud-
es. Our data extraction form has been designed to collect such in-
ormation from each primary study; it includes both standard in-
ormation (such as name of reviewer, date of data extraction, ti-
le, authors and publication details of the study) ( Kitchenham and
harters, 2007 ) and the set of parameters to compare the pri-
ary studies according to the three dimensions described above
e.g., the used state estimation model, attack model, experimental
estbed, etc.). For the sake of brevity we do not provide the de-
cription of all the parameters of our data extraction form, we will
riefly elaborate on each of them while discussing the results of
his study in Sections 4, 5 and 6 ; The interested reader can re-
er to our replication package for a thorough and extensive discus-
ion of all parameters of our classification framework. As suggested
n Wohlin et al. (2012) , the data extraction form (and thus also
he classification framework) has been independently piloted on a
ample of primary studies by two researchers, and iteratively re-
ned accordingly. Then, the data extraction activity has been con-
ucted by two researchers. 
.6. Data synthesis 
The main goal of our data synthesis activity is to understand,
nalyze, and classify current research on automatic control for CPS
ecurity (Kitchenham and Charters, 2007 , § 6.5). Depending on the
arameters of the classification framework (see Section 3.5 ), in
his research we applied both quantitative and qualitative synthe-
is methods. 
For each parameter of the classification framework we divided
ur quantitative analysis on two main steps: (i) we counted the
umber of primary studies falling in relevant categories in the con-
ext of the specific parameter and (ii) we aggregated and visualized
he extracted information to better clarify similarities and differ-
nces between the primary studies. 
For what concerns the analysis of qualitative data, we used the
eywording method for identifying also the possible values of each
arameter of the classification framework, and then we analysed
nd summarized the trends and collected information in a quan-
itative manner. Keywording aims at reducing the time needed in
lustering qualitative data into meaningful cateogires and ensures
hat it takes the considered studies into account ( Petersen et al.,
008b ). Keywording is done in two steps: 
1. Collect keywords : we collect keywords by reading the fragment
of primary study related to each qualitative parameter. When
all fragments have been analysed, all keywords are combined
together. The output of this stage is the set of keywords as they
have been used in each primary study. 
2. Cluster keywords and form categories : when keywords have been
collected, then a clustering operation is performed on them
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Fig. 2. Distribution by year. 
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are characterized. 
4 See Section 3.4 for details on selection strategy, which, of course, determined 
the results presented here. in order to have a set of representative clusters of keywords.
We identify the clusters by applying the open card sorting
technique ( Spencer, 2009 ) to categorize keywords into relevant
groups. More specifically, we consider all the identified key-
words and iteratively grouped them together until a saturation
of all the concepts is achieved and all primary studies are ana-
lyzed. The output of this stage is the set of possible values that
each qualitative parameter can have according to the identified
clusters of keywords. 
Finally, we carried out a narrative synthesis of the results
obtained both quantitatively and qualitatively. Narrative synthe-
sis refers to a commonly used method to synthesize research in
the context of systematic reviews where a textual narrative sum-
mary is adopted to explain the characteristics of primary studies
( Popay et al., 2006 ), usually in conjunction with some form of sta-
tistical analysis ( PETTICREW et al., 2009; Cruzes and Dybå, 2011 ).
In the context of our study, for each parameter of our classification
framework we firstly summarized it from a quantitative perspec-
tive (i.e., statistical summary) and then we complemented such
quantitative analysis by applying the general framework for nar-
rative synthesis proposed in Popay et al. (2006) , namely: (i) we
developed a theory about the specific values of the parameter by
tabulating the results and iteratively performing content analysis
sessions, (ii) we realized a preliminary synthesis of findings based
on the quantitative analysis, (iii) we explored potential relation-
ships in the data (i.e., horizontal analysis), (iv) we assessed the ro-
bustness of the synthesis by critically reflecting on the synthesis
process and checking the obtained synthesis with authors of pri-
mary studies ( Popay et al., 2006 ). 
In the following sections we present the results of our analysis
of the extracted data. In total 138 publications have been selected
and analyzed as the subjects of our study. For the sake of clarity
we organized the results of the analysis according to our research
questions (see Section 3.2 ). 
4. Results - publication trends (RQ1) 
In order to assess the publication trends on CPS security, we
identified a set of variables focusing on the publication and bibli-
ographic data of each primary study. In the following we describe
the main facts emerging from our analysis. .1. Publication timeline 
Fig. 2 presents the distribution of the selected publications 4 on
ecurity for cyber-physical systems over the time period from 2006
o 2015. The first interesting result is the growth of the number of
hose publications in the last years. From the collected data, we
an offer the following observations: 
• There are no selected studies until 2009, the year in which the
famous false data injection attack [S001] has been introduced; 
• Starting from 2012, there is a sharp increase in the number of
selected studies; we can trace this observation to the fact that
(i) in the last years methods and techniques for CPS security
are gaining increasing interest and attention from a scientific
point of view and (ii) methods and techniques for CPS security
are getting urgently needed to produce industry-ready systems
with the required levels of security and reliability; 
• Finally, we can notice that 112 (81.2%) out of the 138 studies
were published during the last three years; this can be seen as
an indication that CPS security is a relatively new area, which is
gaining more and more traction from a scientific point of view;
this observation is further strengthened by the fact that 41.3%
of the studies was published in 2015 alone. 
Fig. 3 shows the distribution of targeted types of venues over
he years. The most common publication types are journal and
onference, with 61 (44.2%) and 69 (50.0%) of primary studies, re-
pectively. Such a high number of journal and conference papers
ay indicate that CPS security is becoming more and more a ma-
ure research theme, despite its relative young age (the first publi-
ation on CPS security from an automatic control perspective was
n 2009). 
. Results - characteristics and focus of research (RQ2) 
As already introduced in Section 3.5 , we identified a set of vari-
bles describing positioning and characterization of methods and
echniques for CPS security breaching and/or enforcing. With the
urpose of evaluating what aspects of system are attacked or pro-
ected by an approach, in the following we indicate which appli-
ation fields, points of view, security attributes, system compo-
ents, plant models, SE and anomaly detection algorithms, con-
rollers, communication aspects and network-induced imperfec-
ions are considered by each primary study. Furthermore, we give
n account of attacks and their characteristics, attack and defense
chemes, plant models used by an attacker and defense strate-
ies, in order to understand how these methods and techniques
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Table 3 
Application field. 
Application field Studies 
Building automation D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) 
Irrigation and water supply Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Amin et al. (2010) ; Smith (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b, 2012) 
Linear dynamical systems Li et al. (2015b) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Amin et al. (2009) ; 
Mo et al. (2015) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; 
Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Smith (2015) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; 
Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Kwon et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2012) 
Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; Zhu et al. (2018) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Bopardikar and 
Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; 
Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Chen et al. (2015a) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; 
Pajic et al. (2015) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; Bai et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; 
Zhang et al. (2014) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Park et al. (2014) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; 
Mishra et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; 
Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Mishra et al. (2015b) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Qi et al. (2015) ; Kogiso and 
Fujita (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) ; 
Chen et al. (2015b) ; Tang et al. (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Kontouras et al. (2015) ; Lee et al. (2015) 
Nonlinear dynamical systems Yang et al. (2016) ; Smith (2015) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; 
Jones et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b,a) 
Power grid: generation Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Hammad et al. (2015b) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; 
Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Amini et al. (2015) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Fawzi et al. (2014) ; 
Djouadi et al. (2015) 
Power grid: transmission Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ; 
Huang et al. (2010) ; Yuan et al. (2012) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Park et al. (2014) ; 
Hammad et al. (2015b) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) ; 
Bi and Zhang (2014) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Hug and 
Giampapa (2012) 
Ozay et al. (2013) ; Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and 
Dán (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and 
Jonckheere (2015) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; Li (2014) ; 
Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; 
Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) ; Amini et al. (2015) ; 
Kim et al. (2015) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; 
Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) ; Gu et al. (2015) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Li et al. (2015a) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; 
Zhang and Sankar (2015) 
Power grid: distribution Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) ; 
Amini et al. (2015) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015a) 
Power grid: electricity market Kosut et al. (2011) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; 
Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Bi and Zhang (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; 
Ma et al. (2015) ; Tan et al. (2015) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
(Unmanned) aerial systems Kwon et al. (2014) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013a,b) ; Park et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Xu and 
Zhu (2015) 
(Unmanned) ground vehicles Xue et al. (2014) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; 
Sajjad et al. (2015) 
Fig. 4. Distribution by application area. 
Fig. 5. Distribution in power grids. 
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v  .1. CPS application field 
The mapping of individual studies to application fields is re-
orted in Table 3 , while the distribution of studies by application
rea is outlined by Figs. 4 , 5 , 6 . As we can see from Fig. 4 , 73 (52.9%) out of 138 primary stud-
es are focused exclusively on power grids. Among those, as shown
n Fig. 5 , 47 papers (i.e. 39.8% of all the selected studies) deal ex-
lusively with power transmission, 10 studies address the security
spects of the electricity market, 4 works are focused on power
istribution, 3 papers on power generation, and the remaining 9
n any combination of the previous ones. 
The second largest group of publications in Fig. 4 counts 38
orks, that is 27.5% of the whole set of primary studies of our
esearch. All these research papers study the security of generic
inear dynamical systems, so the proposed approaches can be used
n any suitable application. However, these works do not provide
xamples of a particular application. 
The last group of the remaining 27 studies is detailed in Fig. 6 .
hese works are almost uniformly distributed among the follow-
ng applications: (unmanned) aerial systems (e.g. unmanned aerial
ehicles, air traffic management systems) and (unmanned) ground
ehicles (UGV) accounting for 7 and 6 of primary studies, respec-
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Fig. 7. Distribution by point of view. 
Fig. 8. Distribution by security attributes. 
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tively; hydro-systems relying on automatic control considered in
5 papers; generic (linear and non linear) dynamical systems and
linear dynamical systems with applications to power grids, both
found in 4 studies. It is worth noting that UGV-based systems deal
with the navigation and control of teleoperated and autonomous
ground vehicles, together with their supervisory control and vehi-
cle platooning. Finally, the security of building automation applica-
tions is investigated in one primary study. From the collected data,
we can offer the following observations: 
• The bulk of the selected works on security for cyber-physical
systems is focused on power grids; this is not surprising, and
may be due to the fact that smart grids are recognized as a
driver for sustained economic prosperity, quality of life, and
global competitiveness of a nation, attracting big research ef-
forts to this area as a whole; also, the models used in this
domain are well-known and the famous false data injection
attack [S001] has been introduced in the context of power
networks, giving traction to this kind of research applications.
Moreover, the impressive market growth in renewable energy
devices posed novel challenging problems in the design and
management of power grids: as a consequence, the interest of
energy providers on novel methods and technologies for op-
timizing network management with guaranteed performance,
safety, and security provided a tremendous boost to academic
research on these topics; 
• Only a small part of the selected papers presents the applica-
tions to the secure control of (unmanned) ground vehicles and
aerial systems, and of heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning
(HVAC), as well as lighting and shading, in large functional
buildings; this application fields are relatively new for the ap-
proaches to the cyber-physical security, with the first studies
appearing only in 2012; this result can be seen as indication
of a potentially interesting direction for future research on CPS
security; 
• Somehow surprisingly, from the automatic control perspective
we have not found any work focused on the cyber-physical se-
curity of medical CPS ( Lee and Sokolsky, 2010 ) (since all the
works on security we found in this domain still rely only on
the typical IT security practices and do not consider the dynam-
ics of physical phenomena of interest, and thus were excluded
by exclusion criteria E3, described in Section 3.4 ). We suppose
that the topics of physiological close-loop control and patient
modeling are seen as not mature enough to consider the se-
curity aspects specific to this important application field from
the control-theoretic point of view. In any case, we expect that
these topics will be considered and addressed in the near fu-
ture. 
5.2. Point of view 
As reported in Fig. 7 5 , we distinguish primary studies based on
whether they treat approaches for security breaching (i.e. attack ) or
enforcing via some kind of countermeasures (i.e. defense ), or both.
From our analysis it emerged that 68 studies over 138 focus exclu-
sively on the various countermeasures that a CPS may put in place
in response to an attack, whereas 35 studies focus exclusively on
vulnerability analysis by proposing or improving an attack scheme
using an adversary’s point of view. They do not study the topic of
the risk treatment, which is peculiar to the designer’s or operator’s
perspective. The remaining 35 works treat both attack and defense
strategies. 5 We use area-proportional set diagrams ( Micallef and Rodgers, 2014 ) for visual- 
izing the distribution over parameters with multiple values in which the discussion 
of their intersections is relevant for this study. 
p  
t  
s  
t  
a  From this result we can observe that the defense strategies are
resented in most (103, i.e. 74.6%) of the selected studies, occupy-
ng the central spot of the research efforts on CPS security. A more
etailed discussion of the various defense strategies proposed in
esearch is provided in Section 5.16 , while the mapping of primary
tudies by the adopted point of view is detailed in Table 4 . 
.3. Considered security attributes 
Security can be seen as a composition of three main attributes,
amely confidentiality, integrity and availability ( Avižienis et al.,
004 ). Therefore, we have identified the security attributes con-
idered by each primary study in order to understand how those
ttributes have been investigated by researchers on CPS security.
ig. 8 shows the distribution of the primary studies across con-
dentiality, integrity, and availability, whilst Table 5 provides the
ap of the main security attributes to the primary studies. 
The first thing that strikes the eye is that 124, i.e. 89,9%, of
he works are concerned with CPS integrity , threatened by various
ypes of deception attacks. Some of these works consider also the
vailability and/or confidentiality, together with integrity. On the
ontrary, only two studies, Ma et al. (2015) and Liu et al. (2014c) ,
ocus on the combination of solely availability and confidentiality ;
hose papers apply game theory to the design of countermea-
ures to intelligent jamming attacks, which have been published
etween the fall 2014 and 2015. For further discussion of security
ttributes, see Section 5.12 . 
.4. System components 
Each approach to security breaching or enforcing considers a
articular set of system components to be compromised or pro-
ected. In our analysis we identified five main categories for de-
cribing the main system components to be compromised or pro-
ected, that are: sensors, actuators, network, controllers, plant. As
n example, false data injection mainly targets a set of sensors ,
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Table 4 
Point of view. 
Point of view Primary studies 
Attack Liu et al. (2011) ; Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ; Yuan et al. (2012) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; 
Hammad et al. (2015b) ; Hug and Giampapa (2012) ; Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2015a,b) ; 
Liu et al. (2015b) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) , 
Amini et al. (2015) ; Kim et al. (2015) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; 
Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Bi and Zhang (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; Smith (2015) ; 
Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Kwon et al. (2014) ; Chen et al. (2015a) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) , 
Zhang et al. (2014) ; Qi et al. (2015) ; Zhang and Sankar (2015) ; Kontouras et al. (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015a) ; 
Tan et al. (2015) 
Defense Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Huang et al. (2010) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2011) ; Hammad et al. (2015a) ; 
Tajer et al. (2011) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; 
Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Yang et al. (2016) , 
Li (2014) ; Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; 
Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; Gu et al. (2015) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Li et al. (2015a) ; 
Amin et al. (2009) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) , 
Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2012) ; Xue et al. (2014) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; 
Zhu et al. (2018) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and 
Hwang (2013a) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; 
Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; 
Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Park et al. (2014) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and 
Tabuada (2014) ; Jones et al. (2014) , 
Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Mishra et al. (2015b) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; 
Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) ; Tang et al. (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) ; Lee et al. (2015) 
Both Kosut et al. (2011) ; Li et al. (2015b) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; 
Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Mishra et al. (2015b) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Rahman and 
Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) ; 
Qin et al. (2013) , 
Deka et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Tan et al. (2014) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; 
Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Amin et al. (2010) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Barreto 
et al. (2013) ; Bai et al. (2015) , 
Liu et al. (2014c) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; Chen et al. (2015b) ; 
Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Fig. 9. Distribution of primary studies by system components. 
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w  hile load altering can attack a set of actuators . As for all decep-
ion and some disruption attacks, we should “note that from a prac-
ical point of view, an attack on a sensor could either be interpreted
s an attack on the node itself (making it transmit an incorrect sig-
al), or it could also be interpreted as an attack on the communi-
ation link between the sensor and the receiver device; similarly an
ttack on an actuator could either be interpreted as an attack on the
ctuator itself, or on the communication link from the controller to
he actuator” ( Fawzi et al., 2014 ). Thus, we say that an approach
onsiders a network either when it does it implicitly by consid-
ring a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on communication links, or
xplicitly, by exploiting transmission scheduling, routing or some
etwork-induced imperfections. By the same line of reasoning, we
ay that the work takes into account a controller when it proposes
 novel one, whereas the plant category comes into play with at-
acks at the physical layer and with eavesdropping. 
Fig. 9 presents how system components have been considered
mong the primary studies, while the Table 6 reports the re-
ated mapping, showing that sensors were taken into account 115
83.3%) times, 69 (50.0%) times alone and 32 (23,2%) times to-
ether with actuators. The actuators themselves were considered
8 (27.5%) times, while network was taken into account in 35
25.4%) studies. This data suggests that the approaches considering
ttacks on sensors and their protection completely dominate the
cene. All the other system components have received much less
ttention, with a slight predominance of actuators and network. .5. Plant model 
We have seen in Section 5.1 that the application domain of
esearch on CPS security is mainly divided between power grids
nd all the others. This result is reflected also in the choice of the
athematical models used to describe the physical domain. 
In particular, power transmission is traditionally studied via a
ower flow model, which is a set of equations that depict the
nergy flow on each transmission line of a power grid. An AC
ower flow model considers both real and reactive power and is
ormulated by nonlinear equations, where the state variables are
oltage magnitudes and phase angles of the buses ( Abur and Ex-
osito, 2004; Wood and Wollenberg, 1996 ). However, SE using an
C power flow model can be computationally expensive and does
ot always converge to a solution. Thus, power system engineers
ometimes use a linearized power flow model, DC power flow
odel, to approximate the AC power flow model [S001]. In DC
ower flow model the reactive power is completely neglected and
tate variables only consist of voltage phase angles of the buses.
s of power generation, the model based on equations describing
he electromechanical swing dynamics of the synchronous gener-
tors ( Kundur, 1994 ) is usually applied. In other application do-
ains more general linear time invariant (LTI) or nonlinear dynam-
cal models are used. 
Fig. 10 shows how the above mentioned models have been used
ithin the set of primary studies, whilst Table 7 provides the re-
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Table 5 
Security attributes. 
Security attribute Primary studies 
Availability Li et al. (2015b) ; Hammad et al. (2015b,a) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Vukovi ́c and 
Dán (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015) ; 
Kim et al. (2014b) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Amin et al. (2009) ; Gupta et al. (2010) , 
Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Smith (2015) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; 
Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; 
Barreto et al. (2013) ; Chen et al. (2015a) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) , 
De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Park et al. (2014) ; 
Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Qi et al. (2015) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) 
Integrity Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; 
Teixeira et al. (2010) ; Huang et al. (2010) ; Li et al. (2015b) ; Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. 
(2013, 2011) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; 
Bi and Zhang (2014) ; Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; 
Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Hug and Giampapa (2012) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Zonouz et al. (2012) ; 
Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2015a) ; 
Wang et al. (2014) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; 
Yang et al. (2016) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; Li (2014) ; 
Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; 
Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) ; Amini et al. (2015) ; 
Kim et al. (2015) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; 
Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) ; Gu et al. (2015) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Li et al. (2015a) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; 
Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Bi and Zhang (2013) ; 
Kim et al. (2014b) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; Amin et al. (2010) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; 
Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Smith (2015) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Zhu and 
Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Kwon et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2012) , 
Zhu et al. (2018) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and 
Hwang (2013a) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Mo and 
Sinopoli (2015) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; 
Bai et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Park et al. (2014, 2014) ; 
Miao et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; 
Jones et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Mishra et al. (2015b) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; 
Qi et al. (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) ; Zhang and Sankar (2015) ; Chen et al. (2015b) ; 
Tang et al. (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Kontouras et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) ; Teixeira et al. (2015a) ; 
Tan et al. (2015) ; Lee et al. (2015) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Confidentiality Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Li et al. (2015b) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; 
Amini et al. (2015) ; Gu et al. (2015) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Smith (2015) ; 
Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) , 
Xue et al. (2014) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; 
Mishra et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; 
Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Qi et al. (2015) ; Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; Xu and 
Zhu (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Distribution by process noise. 
Fig. 12. Number of studies with bounded process noise year by year. lated mapping. The DC power flow model has been used in 58
works (42.0% of whole set), while the more complicated and re-
alistic AC power flow model (which is capable to capture more sub-
tleties) has been studied 18 (13.0%) times. In 8 (5.8%) studies both
the AC power flow model and its linear DC approximation have
been used. Other LTI models were applied in 67 (48.6%) primary
studies. Nonlinear dynamic and swing equation-based models were
applied 15 (10.9%) and 10 (7.2%) times, respectively. 
5.6. Process noise 
To capture any deviation in the plant model from the real dy-
namics of the controlled physical system, the process noise is used.
From the primary studies it emerged that it can be categorized into
three main classes: Gaussian, bounded (non-stochastic) , and noise-
less . 
The mapping of individual studies to process noise is shown in
Table 8 , while the distribution of primary studies by process noise
is reported in Fig. 11 , where the studies considering the measure-
ment model only (70, accounting for 50.7% of the whole set of
selected papers) were not included, since for them the facet of
process noise is not applicable. We can see that the noiseless and
Gaussian process noise models are the most used ones (accounted
36 and 30 times, respectively). As shown in Fig. 12 , the bounded
non-stochastic model (used 9 times) is starting to receive a grow-
ing attention in the very last years. 
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Table 6 
System components. 
System component Primary studies 
Plant Soltan et al. (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Xue et al. (2014) ; Zhu et al. (2018) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; 
Sajjad et al. (2015) 
Sensors Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ; 
Huang et al. (2010) ; Li et al. (2015b) ; Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013, 2011) ; 
Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; 
Davis et al. (2012) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Hug and Giampapa (2012) ; Wei and 
Kundur (2015) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; 
Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) ; 
Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. 
(2014, 2015b) ; Li (2014) ; Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; 
Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) 
Kim et al. (2015) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; 
Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) ; Gu et al. (2015) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Li et al. (2015a) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; 
Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Bi and Zhang (2013) ; 
Kim et al. (2014b) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; Amin et al. (2010) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; 
Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Smith (2015) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; 
Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Kwon et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2012) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Bopardikar and 
Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; 
Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; 
Djouadi et al. (2015) ; Bai et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; 
Park et al. (2014) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Weerakkody and 
Sinopoli (2015) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) 
Mishra et al. (2015b) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Qi et al. (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Zhang and Sankar (2015) ; 
Chen et al. (2015b) ; Tang et al. (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) ; Tan et al. (2015) ; Lee et al. (2015) ; 
Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Controllers Hammad et al. (2015a) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Amin et al. (2009) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; 
Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Zhu et al. (2018) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; 
Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) 
Kontouras et al. (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015a) 
Actuators Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Hammad et al. (2015b) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Mohsenian-Rad and 
Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Deka et al. (2015a) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Amini et al. (2015) ; 
Amin et al. (2009) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; Amin et al. (2010) 
Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Smith (2015) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; 
Kwon et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2012) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and 
Hwang (2013a) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; 
Pajic et al. (2015) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; Bai et al. (2015) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; Weerakkody and 
Sinopoli (2015) ; Jones et al. (2014) 
Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Zhang and Sankar (2015) ; Tang et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) 
Network Li et al. (2015b) ; Hammad et al. (2015a) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Deka et al. (2015a) ; 
Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; Li et al. (2015a) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; 
Amin et al. (2009) ; Gupta et al. (2010) 
Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; 
Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Barreto 
et al. (2013) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Chen et al. (2015a) 
Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; 
Liu et al. (2014c) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Park et al. (2014) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) 
Fig. 13. Distribution by measurement noise. 
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Depending on the assumptions on the noise, sensor measure-
ent models can be broadly categorized into three classes: Gaus-
ian, bounded (non-stochastic) and noiseless Mishra et al. (2015b) .
s shown in Fig. 13 , the majority of primary studies (89, i.e. 64.5%)ses Gaussian measurement noise model; while 41 (29.7% of all)
orks assume noiseless measurements. Only 10 works have used
ounded (non-stochastic) assumptions. Similarly for the bounded
rocess noise, the bounded measurement noise has started to gain
ttention only recently in the CPS security domain, as we can see
rom Fig. 14 . 
The mapping of individual studies to measurement noise is re-
orted in Table 9 . If a study does not consider the measurement
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Table 7 
Plant models. 
Plant model Primary studies 
AC power flow Teixeira et al. (2010) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Hug and Giampapa (2012) ; Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Kim and 
Tong (2013) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Liang et al. (2014) 
Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Kim et al. (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) ; 
Gu et al. (2015) ; Zhang and Sankar (2015) 
DC power flow Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ; 
Huang et al. (2010) ; Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013, 2011) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; 
Tajer et al. (2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; 
Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Hug and Giampapa (2012) 
Ozay et al. (2013) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; 
Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Deka 
et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; Li (2014) ; Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; 
Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) 
Tan et al. (2014) ; Amini et al. (2015) ; Kim et al. (2015) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Rawat and 
Bajracharya (2015) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) ; Li et al. (2015a) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; 
Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Bi and Zhang (2013) ; 
Kim et al. (2014b) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Tan et al. (2015) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Linear time-invariant 
(LTI) 
Li et al. (2015b) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Hammad et al. (2015b,a) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; 
Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Amin et al. (2009, 2009) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Zhu and 
Martínez (2014) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Zhu et al. (2018) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; 
Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; Kwon and 
Hwang (2013b) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Chen et al. (2015a) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and 
Koutsoukos (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; Bai et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; De Persis and 
Tesi (2015) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Park et al. (2014) ; 
Miao et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; 
Jones et al. (2014) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Mishra et al. (2015b) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Qi et al. (2015) ; Kogiso and 
Fujita (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) 
Chen et al. (2015b) ; Tang et al. (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Kontouras et al. (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015a) ; Lee et al. (2015) 
Nonlinear dynamical 
system 
Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Hammad et al. (2015b) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; 
Smith (2015) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2012) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; Park et al. (2014) 
Jones et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b,a) 
Swing equations-based Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Hammad et al. (2015b,a) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Amini et al. (2015) ; 
Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) 
Table 8 
Process noise 
Process noise Primary studies 
Gaussian Li et al. (2015b) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; Amin et al. (2009, 2009) ; 
Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Smith (2015) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; 
Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Kwon et al. (2014) 
Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Chen et al. (2015a) ; Bai et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; 
Zhang et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Park et al. (2014) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; Weerakkody and 
Sinopoli (2015) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2015b) 
Qi et al. (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; Tang et al. (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) 
Bounded (non-stochastic) Gupta et al. (2010) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; 
De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) ; Lee et al. (2015) 
Noiseless Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Hammad et al. (2015b,b) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Amini et al. (2015) ; 
Amin et al. (2010) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Smith (2015) ; 
Fawzi et al. (2014) 
Teixeira et al. (2012) ; Xue et al. (2014) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; Zhu et al. (2018) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; 
Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; 
Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) 
Liu et al. (2014c) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; 
Mishra et al. (2015b) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; 
Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 15. Distribution of primary studies by state estimation. 
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model (e.g., when the work is not related to the secure state esti-
mation against sensor attacks), we say that the measurement noise
is not applicable. Among the selected primary studies there were
13 such studies. 
5.8. State estimation 
For many situations, it may be unrealistic or unfeasible to as-
sume that all the states of the system are measured. In fact, 99
studies were using some kind of state estimation, which corre-
sponds to 71.7% of all the primary studies (see Fig. 15 ). The most
used SE method is weighted least squares (WLS), found in 59 (42.8%
of all) works (interestingly, all 59 studies were related to power
grids). The WLS method for power system SE is optimal under
Gaussian measurement noise Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) and,n case of DC approximation of power flow, leads to an estimator
dentical to the one obtained with maximum likelihood or with
inimum variance methods [S001]. The (extended) Kalman filter
as used in 25 studies (18.1% of all primary studies), while the (ex-
ended) Luenberger observer was used in 13 studies (9.4%), the H ∞ 
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Table 9 
Measurement noise. 
Measurement noise Primary studies 
Gaussian Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ; 
Huang et al. (2010) ; Li et al. (2015b) ; Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2011) ; 
Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; 
Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Hug and Giampapa (2012) 
Ozay et al. (2013) ; Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and 
Dán (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and 
Jonckheere (2015) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; Li (2014) ; 
Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; 
Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) ; Kim et al. (2015) ; Yu and 
Chin (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) ; 
Gu et al. (2015) ; Li et al. (2015a) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; 
Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Bi and Zhang (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; Ma et al. (2015) 
Mo et al. (2015) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Smith (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; 
Kwon et al. (2014) ; Xue et al. (2014) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Chen et al. (2015a) ; Mo and 
Sinopoli (2015) 
Bai et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Park et al. (2014) ; 
Miao et al. (2014) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2015b) ; Qi et al. (2015) ; 
Yuan and Mo (2015) ; Zhang and Sankar (2015) 
Tang et al. (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Bounded (non-stochastic) Tajer et al. (2011) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; 
Pajic et al. (2015) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Lee et al. (2015) 
Noiseless Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Hammad et al. (2015b) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Mohsenian-Rad and 
Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; 
Deka et al. (2015a) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; Amini et al. (2015) 
Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Amin et al. (2009, 2010) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Smith (2015) ; 
Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2012) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; Zhu et al. (2018) 
D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; 
Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; De Persis and 
Tesi (2015) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) 
Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Mishra et al. (2015b) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Chen et al. (2015b) 
fi  
o  
s  
i
 
a  
t  
e  
i
 
p  
p  
s  
s  
d  
a  
i  
e  
L  
s  
i
 
a  
a  
c  
P  
l  
o  
b  
s  
s  
c  
a  
b  

 
s  
a  
W  
r  
t  
a
 
S  
p  
a  
c  
p  
t
 
d  
a  
t
5
 
(  
[  
m  
t  
f  
a  
p  
r  
t  
t  
c  
t  
i  lter in 2 studies and the least trimmed squares estimator in only
ne study. Novel solutions for the SE were proposed in 16 (11.6%)
tudies. The mapping of individual primary studies to SE methods
s reported in Table 10 . 
Novel methods range from application-specific solutions ( Wei
nd Kundur, 2015; Amin et al., 2010 ) and distributed state estima-
ion techniques for power networks ( Pasqualetti et al., 2011; Tajer
t al., 2011; Ozay et al., 2013 ) to generic attack-resilient solutions
nspired by Kalman filter ( Bezzo et al., 2014; Mishra et al., 2015b ). 
Within the domain of power grids, Giani et al. (2013) pro-
osed SE based countermeasures to coordinated sparse attacks on
ower meter readings, that take advantage of graph-theoretic con-
truct of observable islands , which are disjoint subsets of buses
haring the same perceived change of state [voltage phase] un-
er the attack. As a countermeasure to leverage point attacks
gainst WLS SE in smart grid, Tan et al. (2014) introduced a mod-
fied robust Schweppe-Huber Generalized-M estimator. The WLS
stimation method for power networks has been extended by
iu et al. (2015a) by merging cyber impact factor matrix into the
tate estimation as a reasonable adjustment of the weight values,
n order to create the abnormal traffic-indexed SE. 
Regarding generic CPS, to estimate the state of the plant despite
ttacks on sensors and actuators, ( Fawzi et al., 2014 ) proposed
n efficient state reconstructor inspired from techniques used in
ompressed sensing and error correction over the real numbers.
ajic et al. (2014) showed that implementation issues such as jitter,
atency and synchronization errors can be mapped into parameters
f the SE procedure that describe modeling errors, and provides a
ound on the SE error caused by modeling errors. The same re-
earch line is extended in [S104] to prove that for linear dynamical
ystems with bounded process and measurement noise, the worst-
ase error is linear with the size of the noise, meaning that an
ttacker cannot exploit noise and modeling errors to introduce un-
ounded SE errors in the proposed state estimator based on  0 and
 norms. 1 
w
Mo and Sinopoli (2015) constructed an optimal estimator of a
calar state that minimizes the “worst-case” expected cost against
ll possible manipulations of measurements by the attacker, while
eimer et al. (2014) introduced a minimum mean-squared error
esilient (MMSE-R) estimator for stochastic systems, whose condi-
ional mean squared error from the state remains finitely bounded
nd is independent of additive measurement attacks. 
Finally, for linear dynamical systems under sensor attacks,
houkry and Tabuada (2014) presented an efficient event-triggered
rojected Luenberger observer for systems under sparse attacks,
nd Shoukry et al. (2015) , Shoukry et al. (2015b) developed an effi-
ient algorithm that uses a Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) ap-
roach to isolate the compromised sensors and estimate the sys-
em state despite the presence of the attack. 
Together, these results are an indication that the resilient SE un-
er measurement attacks is a very active research topic within the
rea of CPS security, making us reasonably confident about its fu-
ure development and potential. 
.9. Anomaly detector 
Current state estimation algorithms use bad data detection
BDD) schemes to detect random outliers in the measurement data
S006]. Two of the most used BDD hypothesis tests are the perfor-
ance index test (also known in power system’s community as J(x ̂)-
est or χ2 -test ) and the largest normalized residual test (often re-
erred as r N max -test ) ( Abur and Exposito, 2004 ). As shown in Fig. 16 ,
mong our primary studies there are 62 approaches considering
erformance index test, 23 approaches dealing with normalized
esidual test, and 14 considering both aforementioned hypothesis
ests. The mapping of primary studies by the adopted state estima-
ion algorithms is detailed in Table 11 , which shows that 9 studies
onsider an arbitrary anomaly detector implemented by the con-
roller and deployed to detect possible deviations from the nom-
nal behavior, while 43 (31.2%) primary studies do not deal at all
ith anomaly detection. 
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Table 10 
State estimation. 
State estimators Primary studies 
(Extended) Kalman filter Li et al. (2015b) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; 
Amin et al. (2009) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Kwon et al. (2014) ; 
Rhouma et al. (2015) 
Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Chen et al. (2015a) ; Bai et al. (2015) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; 
Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Park et al. (2014) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) ; 
Mishra et al. (2015b) 
Qi et al. (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) 
(Extended) Luenberger observer Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Bopardikar and 
Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; 
Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) 
Tang et al. (2015) ; Lee et al. (2015) 
H ∞ filter Shoukry et al. (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013b) 
Least trimmed squares (LTS) Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) 
Maximum likelihood Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Huang et al. (2010) ; 
Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2011) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; 
Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) 
Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; 
Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 
2015b) ; Li (2014) ; Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015b) 
Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; 
Li et al. (2015a) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; 
Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Bi and Zhang (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Minimum variance Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Huang et al. (2010) ; 
Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2011) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; 
Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) 
Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and 
Dán (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Deka et al. 
(2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; Li (2014) ; Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015b) 
Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; 
Li et al. (2015a) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; 
Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Bi and Zhang (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; Sanjab and 
Saad (2015) 
Weighted least-square (WLS) Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ; 
Huang et al. (2010) ; Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2011) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; 
Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) 
Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Hug and Giampapa (2012) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; 
Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; 
Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Lo and Ansari (2013, 2013) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; 
Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; Li (2014) ; Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; 
Liu et al. (2015b) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) 
Kim et al. (2015) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) ; 
Gu et al. (2015) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Li et al. (2015a) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; 
Choi and Xie (2013) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Bi and Zhang (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Zhang and 
Sankar (2015) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Novel Pasqualetti et al. (2011) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; 
Tan et al. (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Amin et al. (2010) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) 
Pajic et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2015b) ; 
Shoukry et al. (2015b) 
Fig. 16. Distribution of primary studies by anomaly detection. 
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In an effort to minimize the detection delay, the change de-
tection can be formulated as a quickest detection problem. Page’s
cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm is the best-known technique
to tackle this type of problem. There are 6 selected primary stud-es, that propose or use a CUSUM-based attack detection schemes
 Huang et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2014; 2016; Li et al., 2015a; Cáar-
enas et al., 2011; Do et al., 2015 ). There are also 28 (20.3%) stud-
es that propose other novel anomaly detection approaches, some
f which are considered together with the performance index test
nd/or normalized residual test. The novel solutions for bad data
etection cover the topics of distributed monitoring Pasqualetti
t al. (2013, 2011) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) and
pplication-specific anomaly detection for multi-agent distributed
ocking formation control ( Wei and Kundur, 2015 ), automated cas-
ade canal irrigation systems Amin et al. (2010) , wireless con-
rol networks, “where the network itself acts as the controller, in-
tead of having a specially designated node performing this task”
undaram et al. (2010) , multi-hop control networks, “where the
ommunication between sensors, actuators and computational units
s supported by a (wireless) multi-hop communication network and
ata flow is performed using scheduling, routing and network cod-
ng of sensing and actuation data” D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) , air
ransportation systems Park et al. (2014) , and vehicle platooning
ajjad et al. (2015) . 
Y. Zacchia Lun, A. D’Innocenzo and F. Smarra et al. / The Journal of Systems and Software 149 (2019) 174–216 189 
Table 11 
Bad data detection. 
Anomaly detector Primary studies 
Arbitrary Giani et al. (2013) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Bai et al. (2015) ; 
Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Chen et al. (2015b) ; Lee et al. (2015) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Largest normalized residual test Kosut et al. (2011) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; 
Talebi et al. (2010) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Hug and Giampapa (2012) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; 
Kim et al. (2014a) ; Li (2014) 
Wang and Ren (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) ; Li et al. (2015a) ; 
Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; 
Shoukry et al. (2015b) 
Novel Kosut et al. (2011) ; Huang et al. (2010) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013, 2011) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Wei and 
Kundur (2015) ; Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) 
Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Li (2014) ; Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; 
Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; Gu et al. (2015) ; Li et al. (2015a) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; 
Amin et al. (2010) 
Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and 
Koutsoukos (2014) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Park et al. (2014) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; 
Sajjad et al. (2015) 
Tang et al. (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) 
Performance index test Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ; 
Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and 
Zhang (2014) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Hug and 
Giampapa (2012) 
Ozay et al. (2013) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Lo and 
Ansari (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; Li (2014) ; 
Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; 
Rahman et al. (2014) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) 
Kim et al. (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) ; 
Xie et al. (2011) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Bi and 
Zhang (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; 
Kwon et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2012) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) 
Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; Park et al. (2014) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; 
Zhang and Sankar (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) 
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t  In the power system domain, Kosut et al. (2011) proposes a
eneralized likelihood ratio detector, that incorporates historical
ata and does not compute explicitly the residue error, while
u et al. (2015) introduces a new method to detect false data injec-
ion attacks against AC state estimation by tracking the dynamics
f measurement variations: the Kullback–Leibler distance (KL di-
ergence, known also as relative entropy) is used to calculate the
istance between two probability distributions derived from mea-
urement variations. 
The KL divergence is adopted also by Mo et al. (2015) ,
eerakkody et al. (2014) 6 in designing the optimal watermark sig-
al in the class of stationary Gaussian processes, which is used to
erive the optimal Neyman–Pearson detector of reply and covert
ttacks, respectively. 
Valenzuela et al. (2013) use principal component analysis (PCA)
o separate power flow variability into regular and irregular sub-
paces, with the analysis of the information in the irregular sub-
pace determining whether the power system data has been com-
romised. Also Liu Liu et al. (2014a) views false data detection as
atrix separation problem and, differently from the case of the
CA, proposes algorithms that exploit “the low rank structure of the
nomaly-free measurement matrix, and the fact that malicious attacks
re quite sparse.”
Tiwari et al. (2014) propose an approach inspired by PCA, that
ses an invariant “– an over-approximation of the reachable states
of the system under normal conditions as the classifier”; this set is
alled the safety envelope. An alarm is raised whenever the system
tate falls outside the safety envelope. 
Security-oriented cyber-physical state estimation (SCPSE) for
ower grid, proposed in Zonouz et al. (2012) , uses stochastic in-
ormation fusion algorithms on “information provided by alerts from
ntrusion detection systems that monitor the cyber infrastructure for6 This work was extended by [S117]. 
K  
i  
s  alicious or abnormal activity, in conjunction with knowledge about
he communication network topology and the output of a traditional
tate estimator”, in order to detect intrusions and malicious data,
nd to assess the cyber-physical system state. 
Other novel anomaly detection methods in power grid com-
rise a detector implementing the Euclidean distance metric
 Manandhar et al., 2014 ), and a cosine similarity matching based
pproach ( Rawat and Bajracharya, 2015 ). It is worth noting that the
econd one requires the usage of the Kalman filter as a source of
stimated/expected data. 
To contrast false data injection attacks, Sedghi and Jonck-
eere (2015) presented a decentralized detection and isolation
cheme based on the Markov graph of the bus phase angles, ob-
ained via conditional mutual information threshold (CMIT) test,
hile Sou et al. (2014) introduced a scheme, that considers po-
entially compromised information from both the active and the
eactive power measurements on transmission lines. In this second
cheme, based on the novel reactive power measurement residual,
the component of the proposed residual on any particular line de-
ends only locally on the component of the data attack on the same
ine”. Li and Wang ( Li, 2014 ) presented the state summation detec-
ion using state variables’ distributions, which tests hypothesis on
rue measurement square sum S x (assumed to follow normal distri-
ution, given a large number of state variables) together with test
n J(x ̂) . Sanandaji et al. (2014) introduced a heuristic for detect-
ng abrupt changes in the system outputs based on the singular
alue decomposition of a history matrix built from system obser-
ations. To detect the presence of a replay attack without inject-
ng authentication noise to the control signal in networked con-
rol systems (NCS) involving additive white Gaussian noise chan-
els, Tang et al. (2015) presented a hypothesis test based on spec-
ral estimation techniques. For dissipative or passive CPS, Eyisi and
outsoukos (2014) proposed energy-based attack detection mon-
tor. To contrast stochastic cyber-attacks, Li et al. (2015c) pre-
ented an algebraic detection scheme based on the frequency-
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Table 12 
Controllers. 
Controller Primary studies 
Event-triggered and 
self-triggered 
Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Xu and 
Zhu (2015) 
Linear-quadratic regulator Mo et al. (2015) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; Kwon and 
Hwang (2013b) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Chen et al. (2015a) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; 
Liu et al. (2014c) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) 
Linear time-invariant feedback Smith (2015) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Xue et al. (2014) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; 
Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) 
De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; Tang et al. (2015) ; 
Kontouras et al. (2015) 
H ∞ (minimax) Smith (2015) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) 
Novel Hammad et al. (2015a) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Amin et al. (2009) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) ; 
Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Zhu et al. (2018) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) 
Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Kontouras et al. (2015) 
Other Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015a) 
Proportional-integral-derivative Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Amini et al. (2015) ; Amin et al. (2010) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Eyisi and 
Koutsoukos (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) 
Sliding mode Hammad et al. (2015b) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) 
Fig. 17. Distribution of primary studies by controller. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T  
n  
a  
w  
t  
v  
t  
e
c  
a  
m  
c  
v  
c  
a  
d  
s  
r  
f  
t
 
a  
o  
a  
t  
f  
A  
b  
s  
o  
m  
j  
s  
s  
s  
s  
f  
D  
o  
t  
e  
s  
t  
o  
r  domain transformation technique and linear algebra theory, to-
gether with sufficient and necessary conditions guaranteeing the
detectability of such attacks. Finally, Jones et al. (2014) presents
an automated anomaly detection mechanism based on inference
via formal methods to develop an unsupervised learning algorithm,
which constructs from data a signal temporal logic (STL) formula
that describes normal system behavior. Trajectories that do not sat-
isfy the learned formula are flagged as anomalous. 
As a general comment, the literature described in this section
appears quite fragmented, and a systematic high level view is still
missing even within a specific application domain. The different
results and methodologies are very difficult to relate each other
and validate since both a comparison metric and a benchmark, nei-
ther academic nor industrial, have not been agreed and defined
yet. 
5.10. Controller 
Considering the used controller, the first fact emerging from our
analysis is that studies focusing on state estimation usually do not
examine at all the controller. So in 91 (65.9% of 138 selected) stud-
ies the controller is not available. In the remainder of this section
we will focus on the remaining 47 studies, some of which consider
more than one controller at once. 
As shown in Fig. 17 , the most considered controllers are generic
state feedback or output feedback controllers with a control law
restricted to be linear time invariant, found in 16 (i.e. 11.6% of
all) studies, together with linear quadratic regulators (LQR) and
novel controllers, seen in 13 and 12 works, respectively. Variations
of proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller are found in 7
primary studies, while both the event-triggered and self-triggered
controllers, and the H ∞ (minimax) controllers are considered by 5
works, whilst sliding mode and other types of controllers are de-
ployed in 3 papers. Table 12 provides the related mapping. The “other” control schemes not listed explicitly in
able 12 were used in cloud-enabled NCS and in intercon-
ected microgrids, as well as in more generic CPS. Specifically, Xu
nd Zhu [S128] proposed a control design for cloud-enabled NCS,
here the controller encrypts data via a randomized transforma-
ion, prior to the computation of the contro law in the cloud, and
erifies the solutions from the cloud. The presented controller has
hree operational modes, with the switching mechanism between
vent-triggered model predictive controller, buffer mode and H ∞ 
ontroller. Teixeira et al. (2015a) instead studied the impact of
dversarial actions on voltage control schemes in interconnected
icrogrids. It presented two attack scenarios where the adversary
orrupts measurement data and reference signals received by the
oltage droop controllers. Considering sampled-data nature of
ontrolled CPS consisting of the continuous physical dynamics
nd the digital controllers, Naghnaeian et al. (2015) showed that
ual rate control is sufficient to remove all the vulnerabilities to
tealthy actuator attacks, and that if a single measurement output
emains secure, and if the modes of the system are observable
rom this output, then dual rate systems always provide the ability
o detect combined sensor-actuator attacks. 
For what concerns the novel controllers, inspired by the
nalogy to flocking behavior, Wei and Kundur (2015) devel-
ped distributed hierarchical “control methodologies that lever-
ge cooperation between distributed energy resources and tradi-
ional synchronous machines to maintain transient stability in the
ace of severe disturbances”. For a class of DoS attack models,
min et al. (2009) presented an optimal minimax causal feed-
ack control law, subject to the power, safety and security con-
traints. Then, Gupta et al. (2010) studied a similar problem of
ptimal minimax control in the presence of an intelligent jam-
er with limited actions as dynamic zero-sum game between the
ammer and the controller. Befekadu et al. (2015) introduced in-
tead the “measure transformation technique under which the ob-
ervation and state variables become mutually independent along the
ample-path (or path-estimation) of the DoS attack sequences in the
ystem”, thanks to which it derived the optimal control policy
or the risk-sensitive control problem, under a Markov modulated
oS attack model. Zhu and Martínez (2014) proposed a variation
f the receding-horizon control law to deal with the replay at-
acks, Zhu et al. (2018) provided a set of coupled Riccati differ-
ntial equations characterizing feedback Nash equilibrium as the
olution concept for the distributed control in the multi-agent sys-
em environment subject to cyber attacks and malicious behaviors
f physical agents. Kwon and Hwang (2013b) proposed “a hybrid
obust control scheme that considers multiple sub-controllers, each
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Fig. 18. Distribution by communication aspects and network-induced imperfec- 
tions. 
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o
atched to a specific type of cyber attacks”, together with a method
or designing the corresponding secure switching logic. For an ef-
cient transient frequency and phase stabilization in the power
rid, Hammad et al. (2015a) proposed the combined centralized-
ecentralized parametric feedback linearization controller which
s resilient to large communication delays and denial-of-service
DoS) attacks. Cetinkaya et al. (2015) instead presented a numeri-
al method for designing an event-triggered state-feedback control
hat guarantees almost sure asymptotic stabilization of NCS subject
o (simultaneous) malicious jamming attacks and random packet-
osses modeled by a binary-valued time-inhomogeneous Markov
hain. Yuan and Mo (2015) provided necessary and a sufficient
onditions under which an adversary can successfully identify the
ystem model by using only its disclosure resources (presenting
lso the similarities with the known-plaintext attack from the in-
ormation security literature) and designed a countermeasure by
sing a low-rank controller design strategy while trading off the
inear quadratic Gaussian control performance. In order to con-
eal several informations (such as controller and plant model pa-
ameters, measurements and control commands) processed inside
he controller device, Kogiso and Fujita [S124] proposed a concept
f encrypting a linear controller using the homomorphic encryp-
ions, in a way that the encrypted controller need not to keep any
rivate keys for calculating the control input, which means that
he decryption process is not required inside the controller. Lastly,
ontouras et al. (2015) examined a constrained multivariable dy-
amical system, where a contractive controller and a covert at-
acker take turns in affecting the control input. It presented an
dversary control scheme based on an expanding controller that
teers and keeps the state vector outside the desired operation do-
ain, while always respecting the alarm constraints. The proposed
ontrol scheme allows the attacker relinquish its authority over the
ontrol input according to a switching logic, in order to achieve the
ain task with a limited use of the available disruption resources. 
As a general comment, the literature described in this section
erives interesting theoretical results, but there is still a lot of work
o do for addressing the practical challenges in CPS security. 
.11. Communication aspects and network-induced imperfections 
The introduction of the communication network in a control
oop modifies the external signals of the plant and the controller
ue to the network-induced imperfections ( Levine, 2010 ), which in
urn depend on some communication aspects, such as transmission
cheduling and routing. 
When analyzing the primary studies on the basis of this facet
e got a surprise: 119 studies (i.e. 86.2%) do not explicitly consider
ny communication aspect or imperfection, while only 7 studies
i.e. 5.1%) address more than one aspect. The total number of times
ach communication aspect was addressed within the set of the
rimary studies is shown in Fig. 18 , whilst the related mapping is
eported in Table 13 . 
Synchronization errors are considered only by
ajic et al. (2014) (which is part of the research line ofajic et al. (2015) ), where also variable latency and time-varying
ampling are mapped into parameters of the state estimation
rocedure that describe modeling errors. Time-varying sampling
s taken into account also by Li et al. (2015a) and, together with
ransmission scheduling, by De Persis and Tesi (2015) . Limited
andwidth is considered together with error control coding by
upta et al. (2011) (which is related to Gupta et al. (2010) ), and by
undaram et al. (2010) , in which “nodes in a network transmit linear
ombinations of incoming packets rather than simply routing them”.
acket losses and disorder were taken into consideration only to-
ether with transmission scheduling, by Cetinkaya et al. (2015) and
y Shoukry et al. (2013) . Noticeably, Shoukry et al. (2013) took
nto account also the variable latency. Only the variable latency
as considered by Miao and Zhu (2014) and by Jones et al. (2014) .
outing by itself is examined by Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) , and together
ith error control coding, transmission scheduling and variable
atency, by D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) . The error control coding and
ransmission scheduling by themselves were taken into account
n 3 ( Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2014) )
nd 5 works ( Li et al. (2015b) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013) ;
hen et al. (2015a) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; Qi et al. (2015) ), respec-
ively. 
Surprisingly, very few papers (attempt to) provide non-trivial
athematical models of the communication protocol, which in-
eed is a fundamental actor of almost any CPS. In particular, only
n D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) a specific standard for communication,
.e. WirelessHART and ISA-100, is explicitly considered in the CPS
athematical model. 
.12. Attacks and their characteristics 
Regardless of the adopted point of view (see Section 5.2 ), ev-
ry study on CPS security deals with attacks in order to either im-
lement or to counteract them. Each attack threats one or more
rimary security attributes (see Section 5.3 ). More specifically, the
est known attack on availability is the denial of service (DoS) at-
ack, that renders inaccessible some or all the components of a
ontrol system by preventing transmissions of sensor or/and con-
rol data over the network. “To launch a DoS an adversary can jam
he communication channels, compromise devices and prevent them
rom sending data, attack the routing protocols, flood with network
raffic some devices, etc.” Amin et al. (2009) . Attacks on data in-
egrity are known as deception attacks and represent the largest
lass of attacks on cyber-physical systems, including false data in-
ection attacks. The attacks on confidentiality alone are often re-
erred to as disclosure attacks, i.e. eavesdropping , which is discussed
nly in six studies, as reported in Table 14 . 
Fig. 19 shows the distribution of attacks within the set of our
rimary studies. The false data injection, together with generic de-
eption and DoS, with 58, 41 and 23 occurrences respectively, are
onsidered in 108 (78.3%) primary studies, while the bias injection,
he packet scheduling, and the variable structure switching attacks
re considered only once and twice, respectively. 
Characterization of the attacks. Generally speaking, an attack
n control systems can be characterized by the amount of avail-
ble resources and knowledge Teixeira et al. (2015b) . The resources
f an adversary can be split in disclosure resources, which enable
er to obtain sensitive information about the system during the at-
ack by violating data confidentiality, and disruption resources, that
ffect the system operation by compromising the integrity and/or
vailability. The amount of a priori knowledge regarding the con-
rol system is another core component of the adversary model, as
t may be used, for instance, to render the attack undetectable. In
he rest of Section 5.12 we describe the characteristics of each type
f attack individually. 
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Table 13 
Communication aspects and network-induced imperfections. 
Feature Primary studies 
Error control coding Gupta et al. (2010) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; 
Mishra et al. (2014) 
Limited bandwidth Gupta et al. (2010) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) 
Packet losses and disorder Shoukry et al. (2013) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) 
Routing Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) 
Synchronisation errors Pajic et al. (2015) 
Time-varying sampling Li et al. (2015a) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) 
Transmission Scheduling Li et al. (2015b) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Chen et al. (2015a) ; 
De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; Qi et al. (2015) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) 
Variable Latency Shoukry et al. (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; Jones et al. (2014) 
Table 14 
Attacks. 
Attack name Primary studies 
Attack at physical layer Soltan et al. (2015) ; Zhu et al. (2018) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) 
Bias injection Teixeira et al. (2015b) 
Covert attack Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Smith (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Weerakkody and 
Sinopoli (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Kontouras et al. (2015) ; Lee et al. (2015) 
Data framing attack Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2015b) ; Kim et al. (2015) 
Denial of service (DoS) Li et al. (2015b) ; Hammad et al. (2015a) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; 
Ma et al. (2015) ; Amin et al. (2009) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Zhu and 
Ba ̧s ar (2015) 
Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; Chen et al. (2015a) ; Eyisi and 
Koutsoukos (2014) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; 
Park et al. (2014) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) 
Eavesdropping Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Xue et al. (2014) ; Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) ; 
Shoukry et al. (2015a) 
False data injection Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ; 
Huang et al. (2010) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013, 2011) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; 
Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; 
Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Hug and Giampapa (2012) 
Ozay et al. (2013) ; Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) ; 
Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; Deka et al. (2014) ; Li (2014) ; 
Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; 
Rahman et al. (2014) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) 
Kim et al. (2015) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; 
Gu et al. (2015) ; Li et al. (2015a) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; 
Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) 
Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; Bai et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; 
Mishra et al. (2015b) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Generic deception Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Li et al. (2015b) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; 
Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Jia et al. (2014) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; 
Amin et al. (2010) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) 
Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Kwon et al. (2014) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; 
Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; 
Djouadi et al. (2015) ; Bai et al. (2015) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Park et al. (2014) 
Mishra et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Qi et al. (2015) ; 
Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) ; Chen et al. (2015b) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015a) ; 
Tan et al. (2015) 
Leverage point attack Tan et al. (2014) ; Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) 
Load altering attack Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Amini et al. (2015) 
Load redistribution attack Yuan et al. (2012) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; Bi and Zhang (2013) 
Packet scheduling attack Shoukry et al. (2013) 
Reply attack Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Gu et al. (2015) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Miao and 
Zhu (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Tang et al. (2015) 
Switching attack Hammad et al. (2015b) ; Liu et al. (2014b) 
Topology poisoning Giani et al. (2013) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Deka et al. (2015a) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Zhang and Sankar (2015) 
Zero dynamics Teixeira et al. (2015b, 2012) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
o  
p  
d
 
i  
e  
H  In the bias injection attack, considered only by
Teixeira et al. (2015b) , the adversary’s goal is to inject a con-
stant bias in the system without being detected. No disclosure
capabilities are required for this attack, since the attack policy
is open-loop. The data corruptions may be added to both the
actuator and sensor data, and the amount of disruption resources
should be above the threshold of undetectability 7 . Furthermore, the7 In other words, the attacker should have enough resources to construct an un- 
observable attack; a good example of the amount of disruption resources above 
the threshold of undetectability in the context of power transmission networks is 
g
m
w
pen-loop attack policy requires an extensive knowledge of the
arameters of the considered closed-loop system and anomaly
etector. 
In the coordinated variable structure switching attack and
ts extension to multi-switch and resonance attack, consid-
red in the works of Liu et al. (2014b) and in the work of
ammad et al. (2015b) , an opponent controls multiple circuitiven by the security index ( Sandberg et al., 2010 ), defined as minimum number of 
easurements an attacker needs to compromise, in order to attack measurement k 
ithout being detected. 
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Fig. 19. Distribution of attacks considered by primary studies. 
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o  reakers within a power system, and employs a local model of the
ystem and local state information (i.e. some knowledge of the tar-
et generator states, which are rotor angle and frequency) to de-
ign a state-dependent breaker switching sequence, that destabi-
izes target synchronous generators. 
The attack on the scheduling algorithm influences the tem-
oral characteristics of the network, as “it results in time-
arying delays and data packets possibly received out-of-order”
houkry et al. (2013) . To remain stealthy, the attacker is not able
o delay the packets beyond a maximum allowable delay consistent
ith the network protocol in place. On the system level, this attack
oes not require any a priori knowledge of the system model, nor
ny disclosure resources. 
The false data injection is a specific deception attack on state
stimation, introduced in the context of electric power grids by
iu et al. (2011) . This attack on cyber-physical systems is the most
tudied one. To perform it, an adversary with some knowledge of
he system topological information manipulates sensor measure-
ents in order to change the state variables, while bypassing ex-
sting bad data detection schemes. This attack is based on the
pen-loop policy and does not require any disclosure resources.
o construct the attack vectors, a common assumption in most
orks on false data injection attacks on power system state es-
imation is that the attacker has complete knowledge about the
ower grid topology and transmission-line admittances. This infor-
ation is abstracted in the Jacobian matrix H ( Huang et al., 2012;
bur and Exposito, 2004 ), known also as measurement or (power
etwork) topology matrix. By contrast, Teixeira et al. (2010) as-
umes the attacker only possesses a perturbed model of the power
ystem, “such a model may correspond to a partial model of the true
ystem, or even an out-dated model” [S006]. In this way it quan-
ifies a trade-off between the accuracy of the model known by
dversary and possible attack impact for different BDD schemes,
howing that “the more accurate model the attacker has access to,
he larger deception attack he can perform undetected” [S006]. Sim-
larly, Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) argues that “a realistic
alse data injection attack is essentially an attack with incomplete in-
ormation due to the attackers lack of real-time knowledge with re-
pect to various grid parameters and attributes such as the position
f circuit breaker switches and transformer tap changers and also be-
ause of the attacker’s limited physical access to most grid facilities”,
nd presents a vulnerability measure for topologies of power grids
ubject to attacks based on incomplete information. On the same
ine, Bi and Zhang (2014) derives a necessary and sufficient condi-
ion to perform undetectable false data injection attack with partial
opological information and develops a min-cut method to designhe optimal attack, which requires the minimum knowledge of sys-
em topology. 
Finally, the problem of constructing a blind false data injec-
ion attacks without explicit prior knowledge of the power grid
opology is studied by Esmalifalak et al. (2011) , Kim et al. (2015) ,
nd Yu and Chin (2015) . In Esmalifalak et al. (2011) attackers
ry to make inferences through phasor observations applying lin-
ar independent component analysis (ICA) technique. However,
uch technique requires that loads are statistically independent
nd non-Gaussian, and the technique need full sensor observa-
ions ( Kim et al., 2015 ). Kim et al. (2015) instead proposes sub-
pace methods, which requires no system parameter information.
n this case the attack can be launched with only partial sensor
bservations. Yu and Chin (2015) proposes to use principal com-
onent analysis (PCA) approximation method without the assump-
ion regarding the distribution of state variables, to perform the
ame task of making inferences from the correlations of the line
easurements, in order to construct the blind false data injection
ttack. 
Differently from the works on undetectable false data
njection attacks on power grids summarized up to here,
in et al. (2013) presents an unidentifiable version of this at-
ack, in which the control center can detect that there are bad or
alicious measurements, but it cannot identify which meters have
een compromised. 
A special type of false data injection attack on electric power
rid is the load redistribution attack, in which only load bus
ower injection and line power flow measurements are attackable
 Yuan et al., 2012 ). It consists in increasing load at some buses
nd reducing loads at other buses, while maintaining the total load
nchanged, in order to hide the attack from bad data detection.
he construction of load redistribution attack relies on topologi-
al information of the network, that can be derived from the Ja-
obin matrix H . Considering the practical issue that an attacker
an only obtain the parameter information of a limited number
f lines, Liu et al. (2015b) present a strategy to determine opti-
al local attacking region, that requires the minimum network pa-
ameter information. The undetectability is obtained by “making
ure that the variations of phase angles of all boundary buses con-
ected to the same island of the nonattacking region are the same”
 Liu et al., 2015b ). A practical cost-aware “neighbourhood” version
f such attack compromising only limited measurements around
he targeted bus can be found in Bi and Zhang [S071]. 
The data framing attack is a deception attack on power sys-
em state estimation that exploits current bad data detection and
emoval mechanisms. It purposely triggers the bad data detection
echanism and frames some normally operating meters as sources
f bad data such that their data will be removed. After such data
emoval, although the remaining data appear to be consistent with
he system model, the resulting state estimate may have an ar-
itrarily large error ( Kim et al., 2014a ). Also this attack does not
equire any disclosure resources, since the attack policy is open-
oop. By applying the subspace methods presented in 2015 by
im et al. (2015) to learn the system operating subspace from mea-
urements, the data framing can be performed without knowledge
f the Jacobian matrix H . A limited a priori knowledge required
onsists of a basis matrix U of a subspace of all possible noiseless
easurements R of H . Deka et al. (2015b) showed that a general-
zation of this “detectable” attack model produces feasible attacks
n operating regimes where no “hidden” attacks are possible, and
lso considered the impact of adding measurement jamming to the
dversary’s arsenal on the design of the optimal data attacks. 
The leverage point attack is a deception attack which cre-
tes leverage points within the factor space of the (power system)
tate estimation regression model Tan et al. (2014) . The residual
f the measurement corresponded with the leverage point is very
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w  small even when it is contaminated with a very large error. Thus
the adversary can freely introduce arbitrary errors into the meter
measurements without being detected. This attack is based on an
open-loop policy and thus does not require disclosure resources.
However, to be fully effective, it requires a complete knowledge of
the Jacobian matrix H and amount of disruption resources above
the threshold of undetectability ( Chakhchoukh and Ishii, 2015 ). 
The load altering attack against power grid’s demand response
and demand side management programs can bring down the grid
or cause significant damage to the power transmission and user
equipment. It consists in an attempt to control and change (usu-
ally increase) certain load types in order to damage the grid
through circuit overflow or disturbing the balance between power
supply and demand ( Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia, 2011 ). The
static load altering is mainly concerned in changing the vol-
ume of the load. Here the attacker without any prior knowledge
of the plant model uses some historical data to impose a pre-
programmed trajectory to the victim load (an open-loop policy).
In the more advanced dynamic load altering attack, presented in
2015 by Amini et al. (2015) , the adversary “constantly monitors the
grid conditions through the attacker’s installed sensors so that it can
adjust the attack trajectory based on the current conditions in the
power grid” ( Amini et al., 2015 ). With this closed-loop policy, the
attacker having a complete knowledge of the plant’s model con-
trols the victim load based on a feedback from the power system
frequency and can make the power system unstable, without the
need for increasing the scope or volume of the attack, compared
to a static scenario. 
The attacks at physical layer range from attacks that affect
both the physical infrastructure and the control network (of power
grids) Soltan et al. (2015) to attacks through physical layer inter-
actions, such as an attack on vehicle platoon traveling at a con-
stant speed, presented by Sajjad et al. (2015) . The attack studied by
Soltan et al. (2015) physically disconnects some power lines within
the attacked zone (which is defined as a set of buses, power lines,
phasor measurement units (PMUs) and an associated phasor data
concentrator (PDC) ( Huang et al., 2012 )) and disallows the infor-
mation from the PMUs within the zone to reach the control center.
This attack does not require any knowledge of the plant model, nor
disclosure resources. The attack on vehicle platoons ( Sajjad et al.,
2015 ) is carried out by a maliciously controlled vehicle, who at-
tempts to destabilize or take control of the platoon by combining
changes to the gains of the associated law with the appropriate ve-
hicle movements. This closed-loop attack “bears some resemblance
to an insider version of the replay attack of Pasqualetti et al. (2013) , in
that the attacker is part of the CPS and is therefore able inject control
inputs legitimately”. 
In topology poisoning attack an adversary covertly alters
data from certain meters, network switches and line breakers to
mislead the control center with an incorrect network topology.
Kim and Tong (2013) shows that under certain conditions even in
a local information regime, where the attacker has only local in-
formation from those meters it has gained control, undetectable
topology poisoning attacks exist and can be implemented easily
based on simple heuristics. Deka et al. (2015a) proves that grids
completely protected by secure measurements are also vulnerable
to hidden topology poisoning attacks, if the adversary armed only
with generic information regarding the grid structure can corrupt
the breaker statuses on transmission lines and jam the communi-
cation of flow measurements on the attacked lines. Then, Zhang
and Sankar [S129] develops an algorithm based on breadth-first
search to determine the minimum subset of topology data and
measurements required to launch successful unobservable state-
preserving line-maintaining topology attacks. 
The zero dynamics attack, first considered in Sundaram and
Hadjicostis (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2012a) , is one in which andversary constructs an open-loop policy such that the attack sig-
al produces no output. In other words, “these attacks are decou-
led from the plant output y k , thus being stealthy with respect to ar-
itrary anomaly detectors” ( Teixeira et al., 2015b ). For an attacker
ith limited disruption resources, zero dynamics attacks are based
n the perfect (local) knowledge of the plant dynamics. In this set-
ing, Teixeira et al. (2012) shows that zero-dynamics attacks may
ot be completely stealthy since they require the system to be at
 non-zero initial condition; however for the subset of attacks ex-
iting unstable zero-dynamics, the effect of initial condition mis-
atch in terms of the resulting increase in the output energy can
e made arbitrarily small while still affecting the system perfor-
ance. We should notice that an adversary capable of changing
ll the measurements can, of course, force the system’s output to
ero without any knowledge of the model, initial state and nomi-
al input. Furthermore, for a linear not left-invertible system, the
nowledge of the initial state is not required, because an attacker
an exploit the kernel of the transfer matrix and the linearity of
he system. 
With the covert attack, also known as a covert misappropri-
tion of the plant ( Smith, 2015 ), an adversary can gain control
f the plant in a manner that cannot be detected by the con-
roller. This attack requires high levels of system knowledge and
he ability of attacker to both read and replace communicated sig-
als within the control loop, indeed “the covert agent is assumed
o have the resources to read and add to both the control actua-
ion commands and the output measurements. In practice, this could
lso be accomplished by augmenting the physical actuators or mod-
fying the sensors. Examples of such modifications include installing
 controlled-flow bypass around a sluice gate in an irrigation system
nd connecting a controlled voltage source between a voltage measur-
ng device and its intended connection point in an electrical network.
nother potential mode of attack would involve corrupting the PLCs
sed by the nominal controller to implement the control and sensing
perations” ( Smith, 2015 ). Pasqualetti et al. (2013) observe that the
overt attack can be seen as a feedback version of the replay at-
ack, while Smith (2015) examines also the effects of lower levels
f system knowledge and nonlinear plants on the ability to detect
 covert misappropriation of the plant. 
The replay attack is a deception attack (possibly combined
ith a physical attack), in which an adversary first gathers se-
uences of measurement and/or control data, and then replays the
ecorded data while injecting an exogenous signal into the system
 Teixeira et al., 2015b ). The adversary requires no knowledge of
he system model to generate stealthy outputs. However, the at-
acker needs to have “enough knowledge of the system model to de-
ign an input that may achieve its malicious objective, such as physi-
ally damaging the plant” ( Mo et al., 2015 ). The model of this attack
s inspired by the Stuxnet ( Chen and Abu-Nimeh, 2011 ). 
A generic deception attack is an attack on data integrity, where
n adversary sends false information from (one or more) sensors
r/and controllers in order to deceive a compromised system’s
omponent into believing that a received false data is valid or true
 Mo and Sinopoli, 2012 ). Usually it is modeled as an arbitrary ad-
itive signal injected to override the original data. Since generic
eception attacks can be used to represent also other, more spe-
ialized deception attacks, they are considered mostly in the stud-
es adopting the defender’s point of view, presented in Section 5.2 .
There are 26 (18.8% of all) studies using a generic deception
ttack model only to develop some defense strategy, whilst the
alse-data injection into the communication network supporting
he control system examined by Sanjab and Saad (2015) was al-
eady mentioned in Section 5.10 . The remaining 14 primary stud-
es present (generic) deception attacks, that are different from any
ther attack considered above. Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) deals
ith a cyber-attack on the automatic generation control (AGC) sig-
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8 See Section 5.5 for the analysis of the considered plant models. al in multi-area power system as a controller synthesis prob-
em, where the objective is to drive the system outside the safety
argins. It investigates two cases according to whether the at-
acker has perfect model knowledge or not, and provides differ-
nt alternatives for attack synthesis, ranging from “open loop ap-
roaches, based on Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) optimiza-
ion, to close loop schemes based on feedback linearization and gain
cheduling” [S005]. Always within power grids’ application domain,
ukovi ́c and Dán (2014) consider a sophisticated adversary, that
nows the system model and aims to disable the state-of-the-art
istributed state estimation by preventing it from converging. To
his end, he or she compromises the communication infrastruc-
ure of a single control center in an interconnected power sys-
em, in order to manipulate the exchanged data (i.e. state vari-
bles) used as an input to the state estimator. The stealthy cy-
er attacks that maximize the error in unmanned aerial systems’
tate estimation are studied in Kwon et al. (2014) . To consider the
orst-case security problem, this study assumes the attacker has
he perfect knowledge on the system model and can compromise
ensors and/or actuators. The attacks on both sensors and actu-
tors by the adversary with a perfect knowledge of the static pa-
ameters of a CPS (modeled as a discrete LTI system equipped with
 Kalman filter, LQR and χ2 failure detector) are considered also by
o and Sinopoli (2012) , where the adversary’s strategy is formu-
ated as a constrained control problem. Djouadi et al. (2015) in-
tead present optimal sensor signal attacks for the observer-based
nite and infinite horizon linear quadratic (LQ) control in terms of
aximizing the corresponding cost functions. Also this study as-
umes full-information, i.e. the system parameters are known to
he adversary. Zhang et al. (2014) studies stealthy deception attacks
n remote state estimation with communication rate constraints.
ere the deception attacker intrudes the sensor, learns its online
ransmission strategy, and then modifies the event-based sensor
ransmission schedule in order to degrade the estimation quality.
i et al. (2015a) observes that sensors adopt an acknowledgement
ACK)-based online power schedule to improve the remote state
stimation performance under limited resources, and that an at-
acker can modify the ACKs from the remote estimator and con-
ey fake information to the sensor, thereby misleading the sen-
or with subsequent performance degradation. Li et al. (2015a) is
 part of the research line represented by Li et al. (2015b) . Lastly,
i et al. (2015) designs an event-based (online) attack strategy to
egrade the real-time state estimation quality with arbitrary com-
unication rate constraint; this deception attack can be imple-
ented by compromising a sensor in order to learn and modify
he transmission decisions, eavesdropping the measurements and
njecting false feedback information into the sensor. For the do-
ain of electricity market, Tan et al. (2015) studies the impact of
wo common and broad classes of simple integrity attacks on real-
ime pricing, where either the prices advertised to consumers are
ompromised by a scaling factor or timing information of prices
s corrupted, and provides the conditions under which the sys-
em is at risk of being destabilized. Jia et al. (2014) studies the
verage relative perturbation of the real-time locational marginal
rice as an optimization problem; the adversary is assumed to
ave not only the perfect knowledge of the system model, but also
he possibility to access the measurement values in real-time, in
rder to inject bad data that is state independent, partially adap-
ive, or even fully adaptive. Targeting power consumption sector,
ishra et al. (2015a) introduces the price modification attack (un-
er the name of rate alteration attack) which induces changes in
oad profiles of individual users through fabrication of price mes-
ages and eventually causes major alteration in the load profile of
he entire power network. A stealthy deception scheme capable of
ompromising the performance of the automated cascade canal ir-
igation systems is presented by Amin et al. (2010) . This attackcheme is based on approximate knowledge of canal hydrodynam-
cs and is implemented via switching the linearized shallow water
artial differential equation parameters and proportional bound-
ry control actions, to withdraw water from the pools through
fftakes. Similarly, the stealthy deception attacks on process con-
rol systems performed by a very powerful adversary with knowl-
dge of the exact linear model of the plant, the parameters of
nomaly detector and control command signals, are presented by
áardenas et al. (2011) . In the most sophisticated attack consid-
red in this study, adversaries “try to shift the behavior of the sys-
em very discretely at the beginning of the attack and then maximize
he damage after the system has been moved to a more vulnerable
tate” ( Cáardenas et al., 2011 ). Finally, for a single-input single-
utput plant, Bai et al. (2015) analytically characterizes an optimal
tealthy attack strategy, that maximizes the estimation error of the
alman filter by tampering with the control input, as a function of
he system parameters, noise statistics and information available to
he attacker. 
From such literature a systematic characterization of “types” of
ttack is emerging, even if the “generic deception attack” and “false
ata injection attack” have been primarily addressed. 
.13. Attack scheme 
In this section we distinguish the selected studies based on
hether they consider centralized, distributed or local attack
trategies. The mapping between the considered attack schemes
nd the primary studies is reported in Table 15 , whilst the distri-
ution of studies based on this facet is summarized in Fig. 20 . 
The overwhelming majority of primary studies (117, i.e. 84.8% of
ll selected works) considers only near omniscient adversary, capa-
le of compromising several system components in a centralized
ashion, whereas there are only 7 works that study distributed at-
acks, and 18 (i.e. 13.0%) studies dealing with local attacks. It is
lear from this data that local and especially distributed solutions
equire more attention. 
As a side note, we observe that some works are considering the
ulnerability of the system on both global and local scales, with
ttacks following a specific coordination model. As an example, in
im and Tong [S031] both centralized and distributed attacks rely-
ng only on local measurements observed in the clusters are con-
tructed, while in Davis et al. (2012) the adversary needs only local
nformation to achieve the attack, but the work builds on a previ-
us article from the same authors where a typical centralized at-
ack was considered. 
.14. Plant model used by the attacker 
This facet characterizes a modeling framework 8 used by an ad-
ersary to design an attack on a CPS. Since attacker’s knowledge
f the control system and plant model can be limited or absent,
n adversary may rely on a model of plant that is different from
he actual model used by a system operator. Here our focus is on
uch cases. Fig. 21 shows the distribution of the primary studies by
lant model used by an attacker. 
In 114 studies (82.6%) it is assumed that the attacker uses the
ame model of the plant as the system operator, while in 21 stud-
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Table 15 
Attack schemas. 
Scheme Primary studies 
Centralized Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ; 
Huang et al. (2010) ; Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013, 2011) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; 
Hammad et al. (2015a) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; 
Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Vukovi ́c 
et al. (2012) ; Hug and Giampapa (2012) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; 
Kim and Tong (2013) 
Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and 
Jonckheere (2015) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; Li (2014) ; 
Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; 
Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) ; Amini et al. (2015) ; Kim et al. (2015) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; 
Liu et al. (2015a) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) ; Gu et al. (2015) ; 
Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Li et al. (2015a) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and 
Xie (2013) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Bi and Zhang (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Amin et al. (2009) ; 
Mo et al. (2015) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; Amin et al. (2010) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; 
Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Smith (2015) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Zhu and 
Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Kwon et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2012) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; 
Zhu et al. (2018) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and 
Hwang (2013a) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; 
Chen et al. (2015a) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; 
Djouadi et al. (2015) ; Bai et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; 
Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Park et al. (2014) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and 
Tabuada (2014) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Mishra et al. (2015b) ; 
Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) 
Chen et al. (2015b) ; Tang et al. (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Kontouras et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) ; 
Teixeira et al. (2015a) ; Tan et al. (2015) ; Lee et al. (2015) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Distributed Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Hammad et al. (2015b) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; 
Ozay et al. (2013) ; Zhu et al. (2018) 
Local Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Li et al. (2015b) ; Hammad et al. (2015b) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; 
Ozay et al. (2013) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; 
Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Xue et al. (2014) ; Zhu et al. (2018) 
Zhang et al. (2014) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Qi et al. (2015) ; Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Zhang and Sankar (2015) 
Table 16 
Plant model used by an attacker. 
Plant model Primary studies 
Absent Hammad et al. (2015a) ; Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; 
Amin et al. (2009) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Foroush and 
Martínez (2013) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; Chen et al. (2015a) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) 
Liu et al. (2014c) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; 
Do et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) ; Tan et al. (2015) 
Different Kim et al. (2014a) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; Kim et al. (2015) 
Fig. 21. Distribution of primary studies by plant model used by an attacker. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 22. Distribution of studies by defense scheme. 
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s  ies (15.2%) the adversary does not use any model of plant. In the
remaining 3 works, listed in Table 16 , the attacker uses a model
of plant that is simpler than the one used by operator. In par-
ticular, in the works of Kim et al. (2014a) , S056 data framing
attacks on power transmission system are designed using a lin-
earized system. It is shown that such attacks can successfully per-
turb a nonlinear “state estimate, and the attacker is able to control
the degree of perturbation as desired” ( Kim et al., 2014a ). This is
an answer on the question on “whether attacks constructed from a
linear model is effective in a nonlinear system” ( Kim et al., 2015 ).
Liang et al. (2014) studies both DC and AC attack models to con-
struct the false data injection in AC state estimation, showing that
the DC attack is detectable when the injected values are too large,
while the AC attack model permits to “hide the attack completely”
( Liang et al., 2014 ). .15. Defense scheme 
Similarly to attack schemes, we differentiate the studies also
ased on whether the proposed approach to defend a CPS focuses
n the local or global scale of the system. In case of the global
cale, this dimension also specifies whether a defense mechanism
ses centralized or distributed coordination model. 
We recall from Section 5.2 that there are 35 primary studies
dopting only an adversary’s point of view and not concerned with
ountermeasures against attacks. We say that for them the defense
chemes are not available. The distribution of remaining (103, i.e.
4.6%) primary studies by defense scheme is shown in Fig. 22 ,
hile the related mapping is reported in Table 17 . 
Most of the studies (82) on defense mechanisms uses only
entralized scheme, while the local scale is considered only in
 works (( Pasqualetti et al. (2012b) and Liu et al. (2012) , re-
ated to Pasqualetti et al. (2013) and Liu et al. (2014b) , re-
pectively, Li et al. (2015b) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; Kogiso and Fu-
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Table 17 
Defense schemes. 
Defense scheme Primary studies 
Centralized Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Huang et al. (2010) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; 
Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Hammad et al. (2015a) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; 
Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Vukovi ́c 
et al. (2012) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; 
Wang et al. (2014) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) 
Yang et al. (2016) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; Deka et al. (2014) ; Li (2014, 2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; 
Rahman et al. (2014) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) ; Soltan et al. (2015, 2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; 
Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; Gu et al. (2015) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Li et al. (2015a) ; 
Jia et al. (2014) 
Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Amin et al. (2009) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Amin et al. (2010) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; 
Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; 
Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2012) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; 
D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Barreto 
et al. (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) 
Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; Bai et al. (2015) ; 
Weimer et al. (2014) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and 
Tabuada (2014) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Mishra et al. (2015b) ; 
Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) 
Xu and Zhu (2015) ; Chen et al. (2015b) ; Tang et al. (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) ; Lee et al. (2015) ; 
Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Distributed Pasqualetti et al. (2013, 2011) ; Hammad et al. (2015a) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; 
Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Li et al. (2015a) ; Xue et al. (2014) ; Zhu et al. (2018) ; 
Park et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2014) 
Sajjad et al. (2015) 
Local Li et al. (2015b) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; 
Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) 
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9 since this problem is reducible to the hitting set problem . ita (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) , to-
ether with Sou et al. (2014) , where the centralized scheme
ith some relevant local dependencies is taken into account,
nd Sajjad et al. (2015) , where a sliding mode control using
nly local sensor information and a decentralized attack detec-
or is considered). Distributed approaches are examined in 14
orks (alone in Pasqualetti et al. (2011) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ;
ei and Kundur (2015) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Sedghi and
onckheere (2015) ; Xue et al. (2014) ; Zhu et al. (2018) ;
ark et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2014) and alongside central-
zed ones in Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Hammad et al. (2015a) ;
zay et al. (2013) ; Li et al. (2015a) ). We must point out that ac-
ording to our selection strategy we do not consider the studies
ocused on the typical distributed problem of reaching consensus
n the presence of malicious agents ( Pasqualetti et al., 2012a; Sun-
aram and Hadjicostis, 2011 ); this is because in these works the
ynamics is part of the consensus algorithm and can be specifically
esigned, rather than being given as in a physical system ( Gu et al.,
015 ). 
This data suggests that distributed and local defense solutions
equire more attention and surely present a promising direction in
esearch on security of CPS from automatic control point of view. 
.16. Defense strategy 
We have already anticipated in Section 5.2 that countermea-
ures against attacks, i.e. actions minimizing the risk of threats,
re presented in more than three-fourth of primary studies, and
ccupy the central spot of the research efforts. The defense strate-
ies can be classified as prevention, detection, and mitigation
 Teixeira et al., 2015 ); following the line of the fault diagnosis lit-
rature ( Hwang et al., 2010 ), we advocate isolation as a further de-
ense strategy extending detection approaches. 
Prevention aims at decreasing the likelihood of attacks by re-
ucing the vulnerability of the system ( Teixeira et al., 2015 ). It
rings together all the actions performed offline , before the sys-
em is perturbed or attacked. There are 45 studies (32.6%) study-
ng exclusively prevention mechanisms. These studies range from
ecurity metrics for the vulnerability analysis of systems or theirritical components to design and analysis of resilient state es-
imators and controllers capable to withstand some attacks, and
rotection-based approaches aiming to identify and secure some
trategic distributed components. Fig. 23 shows the distribution of
he primary studies focussing on prevention, whilst Table 18 pro-
ides the related mapping and Table 19 reports the mapping of
ndividual studies to each defense strategy. 
Twenty one studies present protection-based approaches.
mong them, there are 7 studies discussing the secure sensor al-
ocation against undetectable false data injection attacks in power
ransmission networks. More specifically, Bobba et al. (2010) show
hat it is necessary and sufficient to protect a set of basic mea-
urements (in number equal to number of all the unknown state
ariables in the state estimation problem) to ensure that no such
ttack can be launched, while Giani et al. (2013) proof that placing
p + 1 secure phasor measurement units (PMUs) at carefully cho-
en buses are sufficient to neutralize any collection of p sparse at-
acks, and Kim and Tong (2013) present a so-called cover-up pro-
ection that identifies the set of meters that need to be secured
o an undetectable attack does not exist for any target topology.
lso Yang et al. (2014) identifies the critical meters to protect and
bserves that the meters measuring bus injection powers play a
ore important role than the ones measuring the transmission
ine power flows, since they are essential in determining a spe-
ific state variable, while the measurements of line power flows
re redundant to improve the accuracy of state estimation. As find-
ng the minimum number of protected sensors such that an adver-
ary cannot inject false data without being detected is NP-hard 9 
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Table 18 
Prevention-based approaches to defense. 
Prevention approach Primary studies 
Control Hammad et al. (2015a) ; Amin et al. (2009) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; 
Shoukry et al. (2013) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; 
Cetinkaya et al. (2015) 
Protection-based Bobba et al. (2010) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; 
Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Lo and 
Ansari (2013) ; Deka et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) 
Rahman et al. (2014) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; 
Teixeira et al. (2012) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Miao et al. (2014) 
Security metrics Kosut et al. (2011) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; 
Xue et al. (2014) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; Bai et al. (2015) ; Chen et al. (2015b) 
State estimation Giani et al. (2013) ; Tan et al. (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; 
Pajic et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2015b) 
Table 19 
Defense strategies. 
Defense strategy Primary studies 
Prevention Kosut et al. (2011, 2011) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Hammad et al. (2015a) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; 
Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Vukovi ́c 
et al. (2012) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) 
Deka et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) ; 
Soltan et al. (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; 
Amin et al. (2009) ; Gupta et al. (2010) 
Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2012) ; Xue et al. (2014) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; 
Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; 
Bai et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) 
Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Mishra et al. (2015b) ; Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; 
Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Chen et al. (2015b) 
Detection Kosut et al. (2011) ; Huang et al. (2010) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013, 2011) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; 
Davis et al. (2012) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Vukovi ́c and 
Dán (2014) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) 
Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Li (2014) ; Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; 
Hao et al. (2015) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; Gu et al. (2015) ; 
Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Li et al. (2015a) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Amin et al. (2010) 
Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; 
Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; Park et al. (2014) ; 
Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) 
Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Tang et al. (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) 
Isolation Kosut et al. (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Wei and Kundur 
(2015, 2015) ; Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and 
Jonckheere (2015) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; Hao et al. (2015) 
Soltan et al. (2015) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Amin et al. (2010) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; 
Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Park et al. (2014) ; 
Jones et al. (2014) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Do et al. (2015) 
Mitigation Li et al. (2015b) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; 
Qin et al. (2013) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Zhu and 
Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; Zhu et al. (2018) 
Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; 
Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) ; 
Lee et al. (2015) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
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e  Bobba et al. (2010) , Kim and Poor (2011) , Deka et al. (2014) and
Hao et al. (2015) present greedy algorithms to select a subset of
measurements to be protected. Besides secure sensor allocation,
there are obviously several other protection-based approaches con-
sidered in the primary studies. For instance, to validate the correct-
ness of customers’ energy usage by detecting anomaly activities at
the consumption level in the power distribution network, Lo and
Ansari (2013) present “a hybrid anomaly intrusion detection system
framework, which incorporates power information and sensor place-
ment along with grid-placed sensor algorithms using graph theory
to provide network observability.” To reveal zero-dynamics attacks,
Teixeira et al. (2012) provide necessary and sufficient conditions on
modifications of the CPS’s structure and presents an algorithm to
deploy additional measurements to this end, while Bopardikar and
Speranzon (2013) develop design strategies that can prevent or
make stealth attacks difficult to be carried out; the proposed
modifications of the legacy control system include optimal allo-
cation of countermeasures and design of augmented system using
a Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse. Then, Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-arcia (2011) discuss the defense mechanisms against static load
ltering attacks and presents a cost-efficient load protection de-
ign problem minimizing the cost of protection while ensuring
hat the remaining unprotected load cannot cause circuit over-
ow or any other major harm to the electric grid. For electric-
ty market domain, Esmalifalak et al. (2013) use a two-person
ero-sum game model to obtain an equilibrium solution in pro-
ecting different measurements against false data injection attacks
mpacting locational marginal price (LMP). Within the same do-
ain, Ma et al. (2015) consider a multiact dynamic game where
he attacker can jam a reduced number of signal channels carry-
ng measurement information in order to manipulate the LMP cre-
ting an opportunity for gaining profit, and the defender is able
o guarantee a limited number of channels in information deliv-
ry. Other protection-based approaches include, for instance “inten-
ionally switch on/off one of the selected transmission lines by turns,
nd therefore change the system topology” ( Wang and Ren, 2014 );
ynamically change the set of measurements considered in state
stimation and the admittances of a set of lines in the topol-
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Fig. 24. Distribution between defense strategies. 
Fig. 25. Distribution by online defense strategy. 
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gy in a controlled fashion ( Rahman et al., 2014 ), that is an ap-
lication of a moving target defense (MTD) paradigm; use covert
opological information by keeping the exact reactance of a set
f transmission lines secret, possibly jointly with securing some
eter measurements ( Bi and Zhang, 2014 ); use an algebric cri-
erion to reconfigure and partition a Jacobian matrix H into two
ub-matrices, on each of which to perform a corresponding resid-
al test ( Talebi et al., 2010 ); use graph partition algorithms to
ecompose a power system into several subsystems, where false
ata do not have enough space to hide behind normal measure-
ent errors ( Wang et al., 2014 ); or even use voltage stability index
 Chakravorty and Das, 2001 ) to identify nodes in power distribu-
ion networks with similar levels of vulnerabilities to false data
njection attacks via a hybrid clustering algorithm ( Anwar et al.,
015 ); “employ a coding matrix to the original sensor outputs to
ncrease the estimation residues, such that the alarm will be trig-
ered by the detector even under intelligent data injection attacks”
 Miao et al., 2014 ), under the assumption that the attacker does
ot know the coding matrix yet. Finally, in order to detect and iso-
ate the disconnected lines and recover the phase angles, in front
f the joint cyber and physical attack ( Soltan et al., 2015 ) outlined
n Section 5.12 . Soltan et al. (2015) present an algorithm that parti-
ions the power grid into the minimum number of attack-resilient
ones, ensuring the proposed online methods are guaranteed to
ucceed. 
Moreover, nine over eleven resilient controllers and eight
ver ten state estimators presented in the primary studies
nd reported in Table 18 were already described in the end
f Sections 5.10 and 5.8 , respectively. The only works not dis-
ussed there are Bezzo et al. (2015) , Mishra et al. (2014) , and
houkry et al. (2013) . In Bezzo et al. (2015) , an algorithm that
everages the theory of Markov decision processes was built to de-
ermine the optimal policy to plan the motion of unmanned vehi-
les and avoid unsafe regions of a state space despite the attacks
n sensor measurements, when “the system is fully observable and
t least one measurement (however unknown) returns a correct es-
imate of a state”. In Mishra et al. (2014) , the state estimation was
erformed in a private and secure manner across multiple comput-
ng nodes (observers) with an approach inspired by techniques in
ryptography, i.e. decoding Reed-Solomon codes, and results from
stimation theory, such as Cramer-Rao lower bound, as a guaran-
ee on the secrecy of the plant’s state against corrupting observers.
inally, Shoukry et al. (2013) presented a minimax state estima-
or and controller design as a defense against packet scheduling
ttacks. 
Always under the umbrella of prevention-based defense, there
re 9 works presenting security metrics , such as security indices
efined in the context of power networks as a minimum num-
er of meters to perform an unobservable attack whether includ-
ng [S004] or not [S002] a given meter, and ε-stealthiness , which
s a notion that quantifies the difficulty to detect an attack when
n arbitrary detection algorithm is implemented by the controller
 Bai et al., 2015 ). A vulnerability measure for topologies of power
rids subject to false data injection attacks based on incomplete
nformation is presented by Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ,
hile the vulnerability of the power system state estimator to at-
acks performed against the communication infrastructure is an-
lyzed by Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) via security metrics that quan-
ify the importance of individual substations and the cost of at-
acking individual measurements in terms of number of substa-
ions that have to be attacked. For the domain of electricity mar-
et, Jia et al. (2014) introduces the average relative price perturba-
ion as a measure of a system-wide price perturbation resulting
rom a deception attack described in Section 5.12 . In the context of
anonical double-integrator-network (DIN) model of autonomous 
ehicle networks, to reflect the quality of the adversary’s esti-ate of the desired nonrandom statistics Xue et al. (2014) defines
the error covariance for a minimum-variance-unbiased estimate of
he initial-condition vector as the security level matrix ” and consid-
rs its scalar measures as security levels characterizing the con-
dentiality of network’s state. Kwon and Hwang (2013a) consider
he dynamic behavior cost and estimation error costs to analytically
est the behavior of unmanned aerial systems under various de-
eption attacks and quantify their severity accordingly. Finally, for
eneric CPS described as linear time-invariant dynamical systems,
hen et al. (2015b) give a necessary and sufficient condition for
he attacker to be undetectable in terms of the system dynamics
igenvectors, and provides an index that determines the minimum
umber of sensors that must be attacked in order for an attack to
e undetectable and use this index to demonstrate a design guide-
ine for improving the resilience of the system to sensor attacks. 
The distribution of primary studies between offline and online
efense strategies is shown in Fig. 24 , while the distribution of
tudies by online defense strategy is reported in Fig. 25 . 
The online approaches come into play after adversarial events
appen ( Zhu and Ba ̧s ar, 2015 ). Detection is an online approach in
hich the system is continuously monitored for anomalies caused
y adversary actions ( Teixeira et al., 2015 ), in order to decide
hether an attack has occurred. Attack isolation is one step beyond
ttack detection, since it distinguishes between different types of
ttacks ( Hwang et al., 2010 ), and requires also that the exact loca-
ion(s) of the compromised components(s) be identified ( Sou et al.,
014 ). Once an anomaly or attack is detected (and isolated), miti-
ation actions may be taken to disrupt and neutralize the attack,
hus reducing its impact ( Teixeira et al., 2015 ). 
Among the 55 studies concerned with online defenses, 16 are
ocused on detection only, other 18 on detection and isolation, 3 on
etection and mitigation, and 8 on detection, isolation and mitiga-
ion. There are 12 works studying mitigation only, and two works
n isolation and mitigation, as reported in Table 19 . 
To contrast unidentifiable false data injection, 
in et al. (2013) present an algorithm to enumerate all feasi-
le cases and proposes a mitigation strategy to minimize the
verage damage to the system. Another work on isolation and
itigation is Foroush and Martínez (2013) , which introduces
oint identification and control strategy, that renders the system
symptotically stable in front of unknown periodic DoS in form of
ulse-width modulated jamming attacks. 
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Fig. 26. Distribution of studies by research type. 
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Four of the works focused on mitigation were already de-
scribed in previous Sections (i.e. Fawzi et al., 2014 in 5.8, Zhu
et al., 2018; Kwon and Hwang, 2013b; Xu and Zhu, 2015 in
5.10 ). Here we spend some words on the remaining 8 studies.
Lee et al. (2015) presents a secure and robust state estimation
scheme that correctly estimates the states under sensor attacks
by exploiting sensing redundancy. It guarantees a bounded es-
timation error despite measurement noises and process distur-
bances. Sanjab and Saad (2015) instead introduces a novel game-
theoretic approach to analyze false data injections attacks that
involve a smart grid defender and multiple adversaries, showing
that at the equilibrium, multiple attacks can eliminate the effect
of one another thus requiring no defense; however, under differ-
ent conditions, a defense mechanism can be beneficial in reduc-
ing the combined effect of the different attacks on the system.
Liu et al. (2014b) recalls their own study of strategies to be “em-
ployed by a power system operator in the face of a switching at-
tack to steer the system to a stable equilibrium through persistent co-
switching and by leveraging the existence of a stable sliding mode”
( Liu et al., 2012 ). Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) presents a cross-layer, hy-
brid dynamic game-theoretic model that captures the coupling be-
tween the cyber and the physical layers of the system dynam-
ics, extending the control and defense strategy designs “to incor-
porate post-event system states, where resilient control and cyber
strategies are developed to deal with uncertainties and events that
are not taken into account in pre-event robustness and security de-
signs” ( Zhu and Ba ̧s ar, 2015 ). The overall optimal design of the
cyber-physical system is characterized here by a Hamilton-Jacobi-
Isaacs equation, together with a Shapley optimality criterion. Also
Barreto et al. (2013) studies a game-theory problem (via differ-
ential games and heuristic stability games) where the actions of
the players are the control signals each of them has access to. It
focuses on reactive security mechanisms, which change the con-
trol actions in response to attacks. Another game-theoretic study is
Liu et al. (2014c) , in which the objective of the defender is to guar-
antee the dynamic performance of the NCS by transmitting sig-
nals with higher power levels than that of jammer’s noisy signals.
The cost function of the proposed two-player zero-sum stochastic
game includes “not only the resource costs used to conduct cyber-
layer defense or attack actions, but also the dynamic performance (in-
dexed by quadratic state errors) of the NCS” ( Liu et al., 2014c ). Also
Li et al. (2015b) present a two-player zero-sum game, to investigate
the interactive decision-making process between a sensor node of
a remote state estimator and an attacker who can launch DoS at-
tacks. It uses a novel payoff function and strategies set, which take
into account the energy constraints on both sides. To contrast the
DoS attacks characterized by their frequency and duration, De Per-
sis and Tesi (2015) determines suitable scheduling of the transmis-
sion times achieving input-to-state stability (ISS) of the closed-loop
system. It considers periodic, event-based and self-triggering im-
plementation of sampling logics, all of which adapt the sampling
rate to the occurrence of DoS and, sometimes, to the closed-loop
behavior. 
The research line of Rhouma et al. (2015) comprises both
mitigation and detection in separate papers. Specifically, in
Rhouma et al. (2015) the generalized likelihood ratio test is de-
signed to detect the termination of a zero dynamics attack and
quickly recover the nominal behaviour of the linear quadratic
Gaussian controller, while in Keller and Sauter (2013) a modified
Kalman filter able to detect the zero-dynamic attack in absence of
sensor or actuator faults is presented. 
Regarding other detection mechanisms, most of all related
works were already described in Section 5.9 . Here we intro-
duce only the remaining ones. Pasqualetti et al. (2013) charac-
terizes fundamental monitoring limitations of descriptor systems
from system-theoretic and graph-theoretic perspectives, and de-igns centralized and distributed monitors, which are complete, in
he sense that they detect and identify every (detectable and iden-
ifiable) attack. To protect active sensing systems against physical
ttacks occurring in the analog domain, Shoukry et al. (2015a) in-
roduced a physical challenge-response authentication scheme,
hat continually challenge the surrounding environment via ran-
om but deliberate physical probes. For a system equipped with
ultiple controllers/estimators/detectors, such that each combi-
ation of these components constitute a subsystem, Miao and
hu (2014) presents a moving-horizon approach to solve a zero-
um hybrid stochastic game and obtain a saddle-point equilibrium
olicy for balancing the system’s security overhead and control
ost, since each subsystem has a probability to detect specific types
f attacks with different control and detection costs. In the power
ystems domain, Hao et al. (2015) takes advantage of the sparse
nd low rank properties of the block measurements for a time in-
erval to make use of robust PCA with element-wise constraints to
mprove both the error tolerance and the capability of detecting
alse data with partial observations. 
The detection and identification of false data injection attacks
n power transmission systems is considered by Davis et al. (2012) ,
hich outlines an “observe and perturb methodology” to compare
he expected results of a control action with the observed response
f the system, while Ozay et al. (2013) use a modified version of
ormalized residual test coupled with proposed state vector esti-
ation methods against sparse attacks. Assuming the attack sig-
al enters through the electro-mechanical swing dynamics of the
ynchronous generators in the grid as an unknown additive dis-
urbance, Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ) divide the grid into coherent
reas via “phasor-based model reduction algorithm by which a dy-
amic equivalent of the clustered network can be identified in real-
ime”, and localizes which area the attack may have entered using
elevant information extracted from the phasor measurement data.
. Results - Validation Strategies (RQ3) 
We determined the research type and related research meth-
ds of each primary study, simulation models, simulation test sys-
ems and experimental testbeds used, repeatability and availability
f replication package. In the following we describe the main facts
merging from the collected data. 
.1. Research type and related research methods 
Following the guidelines of systematic mapping studies, we
euse the classification of research approaches proposed by
ieringa et al. (2006) , applying the research type classification
resented in Petersen et al. (2015) . Since our selection strategy (see
ection 3.4 ) focuses on studies proposing a method or technique for
PS security, so the philosophical papers, opinion papers and expe-
ience papers are not considered in our study. The distribution of
tudies by research type is presented in Fig. 26 , while the relative
apping is reported in Table 20 . 
Solution proposals for specific research problems, where the po-
ential benefits and the applicability of a solution is simply shown
hrough a small example or a line of argumentation, are given in
3 (i.e. 38.4% of all) studies. Those solutions are either novel or a
ignificant extension of existing ones, and often correspond to the
esults of theoretical research. 
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Table 20 
Research type. 
Research type Primary studies 
Solution proposal Bobba et al. (2010) ; Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ; Huang et al. (2010) ; Li et al. (2015b) ; 
Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2011) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Hug and 
Giampapa (2012) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) 
Xie et al. (2011) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Bi and 
Zhang (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Amin et al. (2009) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Smith (2015) ; 
Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2012) ; Xue et al. (2014) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; Zhu et al. (2018) ; 
Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; 
Chen et al. (2015a) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; Bai et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) 
Li et al. (2015c) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; 
Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Qi et al. (2015) ; Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; 
Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Chen et al. (2015b) ; Tang et al. (2015) ; Kontouras et al. (2015) ; Lee et al. (2015) 
Validation research Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; 
Hammad et al. (2015b,a) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; 
Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) 
Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and 
Tong (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Lo and 
Ansari (2013) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; 
Li (2014) ; Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; 
Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) ; Amini et al. (2015) ; 
Kim et al. (2015) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; Chakhchoukh and 
Ishii (2015) ; Gu et al. (2015) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Li et al. (2015a) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; 
Gupta et al. (2010) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) 
Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Kwon et al. (2014) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; 
Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and 
Koutsoukos (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) 
Park et al. (2014) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Mishra et al. (2015b) ; 
Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) ; Zhang and Sankar (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) ; 
Teixeira et al. (2015a) ; Tan et al. (2015) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Evaluation research Amin et al. (2010) 
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10 http://www.blackirobotics.com/LandShark _ UGV _ UC0M.html . 
11 The LandShark is used in Pajic et al. (2014) , which belongs to the research line 
of Pajic et al. (2015) . Validation research is applied in 84 studies (60.9%), where the
echniques investigated are novel and have not yet been imple-
ented in practice; the research methods used are formal math-
matical proofs, case studies and lab experiments, together with
imulations as a means for conducting an empirical study. 
Finally, evaluation research , where the techniques are imple-
ented in practice with identification of problems in industry, is
one only in one study ( Amin et al., 2010 ), in which the Gignac
rrigation canal network is used to demonstrate the feasibility of
tealthy deception attacks on water SCADA systems. 
The mapping of the validation methods used by each primary
tudy is documented in Table 21 . Notably, formal mathematical
roofs are employed in 75 studies (54.3%), while the remaining 63
orks are using just the sound argument. Small numerical exam-
les can be found in 79 works (57.2%), whilst simulation test sys-
ems, described in Section 6.3 , are used to validate the presented
esults in 90 primary studies (65.2%). 
Case studies via simulation, understood as empirical in-
uiries that draw on multiple sources of evidence to investi-
ate contemporary phenomena in their real-life context, espe-
ially when the boundary between phenomenon and context can-
ot be clearly specified ( Wohlin et al., 2012 ), are employed in
 studies, as reported in Table 21 . It is worth noting that in
ezzo et al. (2015) also a hardware evaluation on a remotely con-
rolled flying quadricopter is performed, while the case study of
’Innocenzo et al. (2015) is extracted from its previous work cited
herein ( D’Innocenzo et al., 2013 ). 
Experiments are formal, rigorous and controlled empirical inves-
igations, where one factor or variable of the studied setting is ma-
ipulated, while all the other parameters are regulated at fixed lev-
ls ( Wohlin et al., 2012 ). Among all the considered studies, there
re only 7 works (5.1%) using experimental testbeds , namely Gignac
rrigation canal network seen in Amin et al. (2010) ; quadruple-
ank process ( Johansson, 20 0 0 ), that is a multivariable laboratory
rocess consisting of four interconnected water tanks, used byw
eixeira et al. (2015b) ; LandShark 10 robot, i.e. a fully electric un-
anned ground vehicle developed by Black I Robotics, adopted in
 works ( Tiwari et al., 2014; Pajic et al., 2015 ) 11 , Bezzo et al. (2014) ;
d-hoc testbed consisting of sensors attached to a Mazda Rx7 tone
ing, which in turn is attached to a DC motor simulating a rotat-
ng wheel, used as a platform for testing security of magnetic en-
oder 12 against active spoofing attacks in Shoukry et al. (2015a) ;
icro grid experimental testbed consisting of three Siemens SEN-
RON PAC4200 smart meters connected into the network with
anHua Industry control machine, which is used to monitor all
raffic of lab network and read the data from all meters, employed
n Mishra et al. (2015a) . 
This data indicates that experimental testbed used by re-
earchers on CPS security (with ties to Automatic Control commu-
ity) are still too few, and the validation of the proposed solutions
equires major attention. We believe that there is a pressing need
or implementation and adoption of testbeds with different capa-
ilities for extensive experimental verifications of proposed solu-
ions. 
.2. Simulation model 
As in the case of plant models used by attackers, also the
lant models adopted for simulation purposes can be different
rom the plant models used in the analysis. As we can see from
ig. 27 , an overwhelming majority of primary studies uses the
ame model of plant for both the analysis and simulation, while
nly in 6 studies (4.3%) these models are different ( Kim and Tong,
013; Wang et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2015; Chakhchoukh and Ishii,
015; Jia et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2014b ). Those six studies are12 It relies on magnetic variations to measure the angular velocity of a gear or 
heel. 
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Table 21 
Validation methods. 
Validation method Primary studies 
Sound argument Bobba et al. (2010) ; Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Huang et al. (2010) ; Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; 
Pasqualetti et al. (2011) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Hammad et al. (2015b,a) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Mohsenian-Rad and 
Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Hug and Giampapa (2012) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; 
Zonouz et al. (2012) 
Wang et al. (2014) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; 
Qin et al. (2013) ; Li (2014) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; 
Amini et al. (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; Chakhchoukh and 
Ishii (2015) ; Gu et al. (2015) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Li et al. (2015a) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; 
Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Bi and Zhang (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; 
Ma et al. (2015) ; Amin et al. (2009) 
Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Smith (2015) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; 
Barreto et al. (2013) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; Park et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and 
Tabuada (2014) ; Jones et al. (2014) 
Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; Zhang and Sankar (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a,a) ; 
Tan et al. (2015) 
Mathematical proof Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ; Li et al. (2015b) ; 
Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; 
Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) 
Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Lo and 
Ansari (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; 
Liu et al. (2015b) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Tan et al. (2014) ; Kim et al. (2015) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; Soltan et al. (2015) 
Mo et al. (2015) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; Amin et al. (2010) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; 
Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Kwon et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2012) ; 
Xue et al. (2014) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; Zhu et al. (2018) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; 
Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; 
Chen et al. (2015a) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) 
Bai et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; 
Li et al. (2015c) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; 
Mishra et al. (2015b) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Qi et al. (2015) ; Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; 
Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) ; Chen et al. (2015b) 
Tang et al. (2015) ; Kontouras et al. (2015) ; Lee et al. (2015) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Example Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ; 
Huang et al. (2010) ; Li et al. (2015b) ; Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013, 2011) ; 
Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Hug and 
Giampapa (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) 
Qin et al. (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2014, 2015a) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Amini et al. (2015) ; Rawat and 
Bajracharya (2015) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; 
Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Bi and Zhang (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Mo and 
Sinopoli (2012) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Smith (2015) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; 
Teixeira et al. (2015b) 
Teixeira et al. (2012) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013, 2013) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; 
Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; Kwon and 
Hwang (2013b) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Chen et al. (2015a) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and 
Koutsoukos (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; Bai et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; De Persis and 
Tesi (2015) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Weerakkody and 
Sinopoli (2015) ; Jones et al. (2014) 
Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Qi et al. (2015) ; Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; 
Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Chen et al. (2015b) ; Tang et al. (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Kontouras et al. (2015) ; 
Teixeira et al. (2015a) ; Lee et al. (2015) 
Case study Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Kwon et al. (2014) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) ; 
Shoukry et al. (2015a) ; Tan et al. (2015) 
Experiment Liu et al. (2015a) ; Amin et al. (2010) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; 
Shoukry et al. (2015a) 
Simulation Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; 
Teixeira et al. (2010) ; Huang et al. (2010) ; Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013, 2011) ; 
Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Hammad et al. (2015b,a) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and 
Zhang (2014) ; Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; 
Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Hug and Giampapa (2012) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Zonouz et al. (2012) ; 
Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2015a) ; 
Wang et al. (2014) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; 
Qin et al. (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; Li (2014) ; Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Wang and 
Ren (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; 
Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) ; Amini et al. (2015) ; Kim et al. (2015) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; 
Soltan et al. (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; Chakhchoukh and 
Ishii (2015) ; Gu et al. (2015) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Li et al. (2015a) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; 
Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; 
Mo et al. (2015) ; Amin et al. (2010) 
Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Smith (2015) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Kwon et al. (2014) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; 
Shoukry et al. (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; Barreto 
et al. (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Chen et al. (2015a) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; 
Djouadi et al. (2015) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) 
Liu et al. (2014c) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Park et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; 
Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) ; Zhang and Sankar (2015) ; Tan et al. (2015) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
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Table 22 
Matpower test cases. 
Matpower test case Primary studies 
IEEE 4-bus Huang et al. (2010) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Tan et al. (2015) 
PJM 5-bus system Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Ma et al. (2015) 
IEEE 9-bus Liu et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; 
Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) 
WSCC 9 bus Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Amini et al. (2015) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
IEEE 14-bus Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Yuan et al. (2012) ; 
Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; 
Sou et al. (2014) ; Ozay et al. (2013) 
Kim and Tong (2013) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; 
Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; Li (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; 
Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) 
Kim et al. (2015) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) ; 
Gu et al. (2015) ; Li et al. (2015a) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; 
Fawzi et al. (2014) 
IEEE 24-bus 
RTS/RTS-79/RTS-96 
Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; 
Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; Zhang and Sankar (2015) 
IEEE 30-bus Liu et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; 
Yang et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Yang et al. (2016) 
Deka et al. (2014, 2015a) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; 
Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012) 
39-bus New England 
system 
Hammad et al. (2015b,a) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; 
Wang et al. (2014) ; Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015b,a) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ) 
IEEE 57-bus Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; Hug and Giampapa (2012) ; 
Ozay et al. (2013) ; Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) 
Liu et al. (2015b) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) 
IEEE 118-bus Liu et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; 
Pasqualetti et al. (2013, 2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; 
Ozay et al. (2013) 
Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; 
Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2014) ; Li (2014) ; 
Liu et al. (2015b) 
Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Kim et al. (2015) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; 
Jia et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2015) 
IEEE 300-bus Liu et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; 
Ozay et al. (2013) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) 
Rahman et al. (2014) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; Soltan et al. (2015) 
Polish system 
(2383|...|3375)-bus 
Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a, 2015b) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; 
Soltan et al. (2015) 
33-bus|69-bus RTS Anwar et al. (2015) 
Fig. 27. Distribution of primary studies by simulation model. 
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13 In some works it is referred to as IEEE 4-bus. ithin the power transmission or electricity market application
omains and use nonlinear AC model for simulation, while con-
ider a DC model (sometimes together with AC model) for anal-
sis purposes. It is worth to mention that in 48 primary studies
34.8%) there are no simulations. Those works account for those
olution proposals and validation research papers already intro-
uced in Subsection 6.1 that use only good line of argumentation,
ormal mathematical proofs and illustrative numerical examples as
he research methods. The only exception is Tiwari et al. (2014) ,
hich uses LandShark robot as the experimental testbed, without
elying on simulations. 
.3. Simulation test system 
As it was anticipated in the previous section, 90 primary stud-
es (65.2%) use simulation test systems to validate the presented
esults. The mapping of each study to the adopted simulation test
ystem is reported in Tables 22 and 23 . 
The main tool used by researchers on security of smart grid is
atpower , which is an open-source Matlab-based power system
imulation package ( Zimmerman et al., 2011 ). The distribution ofts test cases ( Zimmerman and Murillo-Sánchez, 2016 ) is shown in
ig. 28 . 
From Table 22 it is evident that the works studying applications
o electricity market (see Table 3 ) use only small Matpower test
ases, namely a modified 5-bus PJM example case (case5), a 4-bus
xample case from Grainger & Stevenson 13 (case4gs), IEEE 14-bus
ase (case14), IEEE 30-bus case (case_ieee30) and its variants, 39-
us New England case (case39), IEEE 118-bus case (case118), IEEE
00-bus case (case300), and an implementation of WSCC 9-bus
 Sauer and Pai, 1997 ) case. 
Generally speaking, the most used Matpower test cases are the
mall ones, IEEE 14-bus case and IEEE 118-bus case, used through
ll the considered power grid domains, while the bigger Polish sys-
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Table 23 
Primary studies adopting simulation testbeds different from Matpower. 
Various testbes Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Hammad et al. (2015b) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Mo et al. (2015) ; Amin et al. (2010) ; 
Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Smith (2015) ; Kwon et al. (2014) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Kwon and 
Hwang (2013a,b) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) 
Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Park et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) ; 
Jones et al. (2014) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 29. Distribution of primary studies by repeatability. 
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f  
t  tem test cases (such as case3375wp) found their way just in 7
works, all in the power transmission domain. 
The primary studies that are using testbeds different from Mat-
power are listed in Table 23 . Two-area Kundur system test case
( Kundur, 1994 ), whose parameters can be found in Matlab Power
System Toolbox ( Chow and Cheung, 1992 ), is used to study power
generation in [S005, S014, S064]. Other typical test cases imple-
mented in Matlab include an irrigation system consisting of a cas-
cade of a number of canal pools, as presented in Amin et al. (2013) ,
which is used in Amin et al. (2010) ; Smith (2015) ; an unsta-
ble batch reactor system presented by Walsh et al. (2002) , which
is a fourth order unstable linear system with two inputs, em-
ployed in Shoukry et al. (2013) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Tennessee
Eastman process control system model and associated multi-loop
proportional-integral control law, as proposed by Ricker (1993) ,
that is adopted in Mo et al. (2015) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) ;
Miao and Zhu (2014) ; PHANToM Premium 1.5A ( Taati et al., 2008 ),
that is a haptic device from SensAble Technologies, used in a sim-
ulation setup in Liu et al. (2014c) ; finally, a rotorcraft in a cruise
flight ( Narendra and Tripathi, 1973 ) is simulated in Kwon and
Hwang (2013a,b) . 
The remaining primary studies listed in Table 23 use ad
hoc simulation test cases to validate their results. Specifically,
Kwon et al. (2014) use Monte Carlo simulation with 10 0 0 runs
on an unmanned aerial system navigation system integrating the
inertial navigation system and the global positioning system im-
plemented in Matlab. D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) perform Mat-
lab/Simulink simulations on the multi-hop wireless network de-
ployed in a room to connect the temperature sensor to the
variable-air-volume box, which is positioned nearby the room.
Also Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) perform Matlab/Simulink sim-
ulations on a single-input single-output (SISO) system; it deals
with a velocity control of a single joint robotic arm over a com-
munication network. Bezzo et al. (2014) use robot operating sys-
tem 14 (ROS) based simulator emulating electromechanical and dy-
namical behavior of the real robot. In Park et al. (2014) simu-
lations are carried out using a simple model of air traffic oper-
ations. Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) use an UGV model imple-
mented in Matlab. Jones et al. (2014) simulate a train, which
uses an electronically-controlled pneumatic braking system mod-
eled as a classical hybrid automaton. In the research line of
Shoukry et al. (2015b) , the authors developed a “theory solver in
Matlab and interfaced it with the pseudo-Boolean SAT solver SAT4J”
( Shoukry et al., 2015 ), where the simulations are performed on
linear dynamical systems with a variable number of sensors and
system states. Finally, Xu and Zhu [S128] perform Matlab/Simulink
simulations on a small-scale unmanned helicopter whose dynamic
model is linearized at its hovering point ( Cai et al., 2011 ). 
From the analysed data it is evident that most of the works still
use relatively small simulation test cases to validate the proposed
results, while more challenging examples can be found only in the
power networks application domain, with some simulations per-
formed on Matpower Polish system test cases. Despite research on
CPS security in this domain appears quite mature, a benchmark is
still missing. 14 http://www.ros.org . .4. Repeatability and availability of replication package 
The possibility of reproducing the evaluation or validation re-
ults provided by the authors is called repeatability, while the pos-
ibility of exploring changes to experiment parameters is known
s workability. The repeatability process is a good scientific prac-
ice ( Bonnet et al., 2011 ). The so called Artifact Evaluation Process 15 
s used in a number of conferences in computer science, and a
imilar concept of repeatability evaluation of computational ele-
ents has been introduced in cyber-physical systems domain in
014 ACM Hybrid Systems Computation and Control (HSCC) confer-
nce 16 . However, such practice is rather new to research commu-
ities adopting automatic control perspective on security of CPS:
e found no primary study with a replication package. Thus, we
ave isolated the information concerning the availability of a repli-
ation package and extended the simple dimension provided in
uan et al. (2014) in a way that repeatability is considered high
hen the authors provide enough details about (i) the steps per-
ormed for evaluating or validating the study, (ii) the developed or
sed software, (iii) the used or simulated testbed, if any, and (iv)
ny other additional resource, in a way that interested third par-
ies can be able to repeat the evaluation or validation of the study.
therwise, we have low repeatability. 
Such high-level definition of repeatability values has en-
ured that the primary studies using standard test systems from
ection 6.3 and well known experimental testbeds have received
igh values of repeatability, where steps performed in their ex-
eriments, case studies and/or simulation examples have been de-
cribed with enough details. On the other hand, the usage of some
d hoc simulation test system has caused some low values of re-
eatability assigned. As shown in Fig. 29 , 84 studies (60.9%) have a
igh repeatability value, and 12 studies (8.7%) have a low repeata-
ility score. As a note, we did not have the possibility to evaluate
he repeatability of 42 studies (30.4%) since they do not present
ny experiment, case study or simulation example. Overall, we ad-
ocate the improving of repeatability and workability of computa-
ional results of the papers by adopting the best practices of re-
eatability process and creating related replication packages, be-
ause we strongly believe in the usefulness of repeatability to em-
ower others to build on top of the contributions of a paper 17 and
hus accelerate scientific and technological progress. 
. Implications for future research 
We discussed potential future research trends and challenges
or CPS security from automatic control perspective throughout
his paper in the context of the various discussions of results ob-15 http://www.artifact-eval.org . 
16 http://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/conferences/hscc2016/re.html . 
17 http://evaluate.inf.usi.ch/artifacts/aea . 
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u  ained in our systematic mapping study of the first ten years of the
eld ( Sections 4, 5 , and 6 ); in the following we present how re-
earch on security in cyber-physical realm has evolved since 2016
nd provide more general observations about implications for fu-
ure research. 
First of all, CPS security is a relatively young research domain
hat is experiencing a strong academic (and industrial) interest in
he very few years, as seen from the publication trend reported in
ig. 2 , and both European Commission and NSF are very oriented
n financing research in this area. From the data obtained in the
ystematic mapping part of our study it can be inferred that the
otential of the developed results and methodologies in addressing
ealistic emerging problems in several application domains (first of
ll, power systems) is very promising. As a consequence it is pre-
ictable that CPS security will be a “hot topic” for the forthcoming
ears. 
Based on the informal analysis of several notable works avail-
ble in literature from 2016 to mid 2018, we can affirm that the
ncreasing trend did not stop. In fact, also if we consider CPS deal-
ng with cyber attacks with a generic dynamical systems model-
ng framework only, a huge amount of works can be found, as for
xample ( Weerakkody et al., 2016; Bai et al., 2017a; Chen et al.,
018b; Pajic et al., 2017b; Ding et al., 2017b; 2017a; Zheng et al.,
016; Yuan et al., 2016; Mo and Sinopoli, 2016; Chen et al., 2017b;
in et al., 2017; Kung et al., 2017 ), just to cite a few. Another large
mount of works can be found if we only focus our attention on
ttack detection and identification, and state estimation ( Nakahira
nd Mo, 2018; Mo and Garone, 2016; Weerakkody et al., 2017;
ai et al., 2017b; Mishra et al., 2017; Murguia and Ruths, 2016; Li
t al., 2017c; 2017d; Chen et al., 2017a; Shi et al., 2017; Shoukry
t al., 2018; 2017; Pajic et al., 2017a; Shoukry and Tabuada, 2016;
eerakkody and Sinopoli, 2016; Ao et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2018;
orti et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2018 ). It is worth to emphasize that
ne of the path followed by researcher to improve the research in
PS security consists on considering more accurate, but also more
omplex, models such as stochastic, nonlinear and delayed sys-
ems ( Ding et al., 2018b; Hu et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016a; Wang
t al., 2017 ). We should also note that some of the aforementioned
orks are extensions of the research lines considered by our sys-
ematic mapping, since Bai et al. (2017a) ; Mishra et al. (2017) ;
houkry and Tabuada (2016) ; Lee et al. (2018) are clearly re-
ated to Bai et al. (2015) ; Mishra et al. (2015b) ; Shoukry and
abuada (2014) ; Lee et al. (2015) , respectively, while both Pajic
t al. (2017b,a) are linked to Pajic et al. (2015) , and Shoukry et al.
2018, 2017) are associated with [S122]. 
From a modeling point of view, while Gaussian model of noise
used e.g. in Weerakkody et al., 2016; Bai et al., 2017a; Chen et al.,
018b; Ding et al., 2017b; Ding et al., 2017a; Zheng et al., 2016; Mo
nd Sinopoli, 2016; Chen et al., 2017b; Kung et al., 2017; Mo and
arone, 2016; Bai et al., 2017b; Mishra et al., 2017; Murguia and
uths, 2016; Li et al., 2017c; Li et al., 2017d; Shi et al., 2017; Weer-
kkody and Sinopoli, 2016; Forti et al., 2018; Ding et al., 2018b; Hu
t al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016a; Wang et al., 2017 ) still clearly dom-
nates the scene, the bounded model (found in Pajic et al., 2017b;
akahira and Mo, 2018; Shoukry et al., 2018; Shoukry et al., 2017;
ajic et al., 2017a; Lee et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2018 ) is considered
ore and more often. This fact indicates an increasing attention to
he aspects of robustness of the proposed solutions, and that the
odel-based methods and techniques for enforcing security in the
yber-physical domain are acquiring certain maturity. 
Another confirmation concerns a cornerstone application of the
PS security: power grids. Indeed, due to the integration of in-
ormation technology and the vulnerability of communication net-
orks, power grids are extremely exposed to cyber-attacks. Thus
esearchers are still very involved in this context, see for ex-
mple Wei et al. (2018) ; Zhang et al. (2017) ; Li et al. (2017e) ;ang et al. (2017a) ; Rahman et al. (2017) ; Ashok et al. (2017) ;
arraj et al. (2016) ; Anwar et al. (2017) ; Ao et al. (2016) ;
iu et al. (2016b) ; Sanjab and Saad (2016) ; Esnaola et al. (2016) ;
rikantha and Kundur (2016) ; Liu and Li (2017b) ; Zhang and
ankar (2016) ; Liu et al. (2017) ; Taha et al. (2018) ; Ye et al. (2016) ;
iraldo et al. (2017a) ; Isozaki et al. (2016) ; Li et al. (2016b) ;
in et al. (2018a) ; Liu and Li (2017c) ; Zhao et al. (2017b) ;
eng et al. (2017a) ; Ashok et al. (2018) ; Yang et al. (2017b) ;
hen et al. (2018a) ; Yang et al. (2017b) ; Bretas et al. (2017) ;
ttia et al. (2018) ; Amini et al. (2018) , and many others. These
orks mainly consider IEEE bus systems as testbeds to simulate
he methodology they propose. Much less works consider differ-
nt testbeds, such as a hybrid automaton model of DC microgrids
 Beg et al., 2017 ), or simulators built by the authors, like the MAS-
IM ( Gai et al., 2017 ) (that unfortunately at the moment is not
ublicly available for independent use or just replication purposes)
nd the PowerWorld ( Li et al., 2016a; 2017a ). Also novel algorithms
hat are validated by experiments on a physical system, as the case
f the 16-bus power system testbed in Tan et al. (2017) , are still
are. This fact highlights a significant need to evaluate new con-
epts and vulnerabilities by experimental facilities, as those sur-
eyed by Cintuglu et al. (2017) . The theoretical research on se-
urity of power grids is expanding in several directions, such as
onsidering the consequences of false data injection attacks on an
C state estimation, by analyzing the results of a DC-based op-
imization problem ( Liang et al., 2016 ), or dealing with reduced
mount of information available to an attacker when construct-
ng an undetectable attack vector ( Liu and Li, 2017a; Chin et al.,
017 ). Also Markovian models to represent the power system and
he attack has been under investigation in the last years, as in
he case of Huang et al. (2016) ; Karimipour and Dinavahi (2018) ;
iang et al. (2017) . Other researchers are exploring completely dif-
erent approaches, such as consensus ( Zhao et al., 2017a ), and con-
idering specific categories of attacks, as part of the larger class of
eception attacks, like coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs)
 Deng et al., 2017c ), and control-related attacks ( Lin et al., 2018b ).
otably, some of the named works on smart grid security are the
ollow up of the research lines already seen in our systematic map-
ing: for instance, Sanjab and Saad (2016) ; Amini et al. (2018) ;
uang et al. (2016) are the journal versions of the respective con-
erence works ( Sanjab and Saad, 2015; Amini et al., 2015; Huang
t al., 2010 ). 
An increasing trend, with respect to the period 2006–2015, can
e seen in networked CPSs ( Satchidanandan and Kumar, 2017; Ding
t al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2016; Sun et al., 2018; Teixeira et al.,
017 ). Several aspects have been investigated on this topic, with
aper focusing on stability ( De Persis and Tesi, 2016; Feng and
esi, 2017; Dolk et al., 2017; Pang et al., 2018 ), state estimation
 Tsiamis et al., 2017; Miao et al., 2017; Keller et al., 2016; Guo et al.,
018; 2017 ), and output tracking control ( Pang et al., 2016 ). Also
n this case, one of the research directions is taking into account
ore complex models, such as Markovian models, addressing sta-
ility and state estimation problems ( Cetinkaya et al., 2017; 2018;
ing et al., 2017c; Zhang et al., 2018 ). Furthermore, although we
ould have excluded papers on sensor networks due to our selec-
ion criteria, it is worth to mention few papers to underline that
PS security with focus on wireless sensor networks is an active
esearch area ( Li et al., 2017b; 2018; Ma et al., 2017 ). The same
lso applies to works on consensus ( Senejohnny et al., 2017; Zhao
t al., 2017a ). Also here several results from research lines pre-
ented in our systematic mapping are spread through new publi-
ations, with e.g. Keller et al. (2016) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2017) follow-
ng Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) , respectively, and
ing et al. (2017c) ; Li et al. (2017b) both linked to Li et al. (2015b) .
Differently from networked control systems, CPS security with
nmanned aerial vehicle applications did not explode until now,
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despite some good papers can be found in literature ( Chen et al.,
2016; Abbaspour et al., 2016 ). This is true also for works that fo-
cus specifically on industrial control systems ( Garcia et al., 2017;
Urbina et al., 2016b; Paridari et al., 2018; Huang et al., 2018 ), also
proposing a testbed to understand the impact of cyber and phys-
ical attacks on a particular type of industrial control systems, i.e.
water treatment system ( Adepu and Mathur, 2016; Mathur and
Tippenhauer, 2016 ), on cryptography for CPS, which has been fur-
ther investigated in recent years considering for example both fully
and semi-homomorphic encryption techniques for secuirity of CPS
( Kim et al., 2016; Farokhi et al., 2017 ), and on applications of
formal methods to reason about CPS and cyber-physical attacks
( Lanotte et al., 2017 ). 
Novel directions have also started, exploring different fields
other than the ones described in this paper. In particular, security
in teleoperated robotics rised up too, addresing vulnerability issues
against different type of cyber attacks, as for example static ma-
lignant content modification attacks (MCoMA) ( Dong et al., 2016 ),
or focusing on experimental analysis on specific systems, as for
the advanced teleoperated robotic surgery system considered in
Bonaci et al. (2015) , although its journal version is still in prepa-
ration. 
A very interesting aspect that came up analyzing papers of the
last years is the increasing consideration of data-driven methods.
Indeed, all the approaches described above can be affected by is-
sues that are not always considered during the definition of the
modeling framework. For example, it can be difficult, in general, to
know a priori what type of attacks may be inserted into the sys-
tem, moreover it can also be difficult to derive a mathematical de-
scription of the system that is based on the physics when the sys-
tem is extremely complex. As experience demonstrates, e.g. in the
context of energy efficient control of building automation systems
( Smarra et al., 2018 ), in many CPS application domains the cost
of modeling is much larger than the improvement margin in terms
of efficiency/cost/performance. In this scenario, the data-driven ap-
proaches introduce an important novelty. In the last years, this
topic attracted researcher’s interest, and few papers are avail-
able in different domains, as for example anomaly detection for
CPSs ( Shi et al., 2018 ), detection of cyber attacks against vehicles
( Loukas et al., 2018 ), attack detection on unmanned aerial vehicles
( Abbaspour et al., 2016 ) and smart grids ( Ozay et al., 2016 ). 
In the future data-driven methods will play a key role to im-
prove the modeling framework of CPSs and attacks, and to help
the system to correct itself based on the data generated on-line by
the system, leveraging the learning potential of the machine learn-
ing. Coupled with classical modeling techniques they could also be
used to come up with an unified paradigm to address CPS security.
8. Related work 
Recently, we have seen a large increase in the surveys of CPS fo-
cusing exclusively on security and/or privacy from different points
of view, and a recent survey by Giraldo et al. (2017b) has provided
a useful overview of 32 papers (including the early preliminary
version of this work) categorized by application domains (such
as smart grids ( He and Yan, 2016; Cintuglu et al., 2017 ), medical
devices ( Rushanan et al., 2014; Camara et al., 2015; AlTawy and
Youssef, 2016 ), industrial control systems ( Stouffer et al., 2015b;
McLaughlin et al., 2016; Urbina et al., 2016a ), manufacturing ( Wells
et al., 2014; Pan et al., 2017; Zeltmann et al., 2016 ), and intelligent
transportation systems), the addressed attacks and defences, re-
search trends, network security, security-level implementation, and
computational strategies. Notably, among all 32 works analysed by
Giraldo et al. (2017b) , there was only one other systematic study,
developed by Nguyen et al. (2017) , which had a very different
scope from ours, with a very specialized focus on model-based se-urity engineering. Nguyen et al. (2017) employed the same com-
only accepted guidelines reported in Petersen et al. (2015) and
itchenham and Charters (2007) to show how software models can
elp in design and verification of CPS. 
Later on, two new surveys on false data injection attacks
n state estimation in power systems, both summarising the
heoretical basis of such attacks, their impact in case of suc-
ess and the defence strategies against them, were conducted by
eng et al. (2017b) and Liang et al. (2017) . 
Before them, the cyber-physical systems security within the
mart grid domain has been reviewed by Mo et al. (2012) and by
ridhar et al. (2012) . 
The work from Mo et al. (2012) is a good starting point to
ace the area of CPS security since it gives a broad overview
n cyber and system-theoretic approaches to security and shows
ow a combination of both of them together can provide bet-
er security level than traditional methods. The provided exam-
le describes defense against replay attack following secure control
 Cárdenas et al., 2008b ) method. 
The article from Sridhar et al. (2012) is more domain-specific.
ince power system is functionally divided into generation, trans-
ission, and distribution, the survey considers cyber vulnerabili-
ies and security solutions for each of the underlying fields. No-
ably, it deals with a wide range of (sophisticated) attacks, some
ad data detection techniques and mentions attack resilient con-
rol. This work provides also an overview on supporting infrastruc-
ure security, with a look on secure communication, device secu-
ity, security management and awareness, cyber security evalua-
ion, and intrusion tolerance. All in all, the paper identifies the im-
ortance of combining both power application security and sup-
orting infrastructure security into the risk assessment process and
rovides a methodology for impact evaluation. Conclusively, it lists
 number of emerging research challenges in risk modeling and
itigation, pointing out the importance of attack resilient control,
omain-specific anomaly detection and intrusion tolerance. 
Lastly, Ding et al. (2018a) surveyed the recent advances on secu-
ity control and attack detection for industrial CPS from a control
heory perspective, rising some challenging issues for the future
esearch. 
Finally, we should observe that based on the guidelines for per-
orming systematic literature reviews from Kitchenham and Char-
ers (2007) , all but Nguyen et al. (2017) the aforementioned arti-
les cannot be considered as a systematic literature reviews but as
nformal literature surveys , and cannot be compared directly to this
apping study. 
. Conclusions and future work 
In this work we provided an overview of the state of the art
f research in CPS security enforcing or breaching, considering an
utomatic control perspective. The presented survey is based on
 well-established empirical methodology, called systematic map-
ing, which allowed us to provide a review that is complete, com-
rehensive, and not biased from personal experience. 
The main contribution of this paper is a systematic map that
overs the first ten years of research on cyber-physical security. It
rovides a statistical summary of important features in the field,
uch as targeted applications and system components, adopted
trategies and validation of results, together with emerging pub-
ication trends. The obtained results permit to find a clear picture
f the sate-of-the-art of a topic of interest, as for example decep-
ion attacks on state estimation in power grids, while remaining
ware of a broader picture on the works with similar character-
stics, as for instance deception attacks on state estimation of a
eneric cyber-physical system. 
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18 The reference Gupta et al. (2010) is related to Gupta et al. (2011) , which is a 
part of the same research line. Starting from these results, that systematically cover the evo-
ution of the topic from its beginning, we analyzed the relevant
orks on cyber-physical security published from 2016 to mid 2018.
his allowed us to show, through empirical evidence, that investi-
ation of cyber-physical security enforcing or breaching is indeed
 very active and expanding area of research, and emphasize how
he topic evolved, thus providing hints on the weak points and
romising new directions of this appealing research area. 
We believe that this study may inspire researchers with new
esearch lines, as happened to us. In particular, we got exposed
o the literature on hybrid systems with stochastic switching, and
tarted our research line on time-inhomogeneous Markov jump
inear systems with bounded uncertainties on transition probabili-
ies. After having solved the fundamental problems of stability and
ptimal control ( Zacchia Lun et al., 2016; 2017 ), we are now ap-
roaching the issues of fault (and attack) detection and isolation.
n the domain of multi-hop control networks, we already got some
xciting results on the topic, providing stabilizability, and fault de-
ection and isolation conditions for the networks subject to node
ailures and malicious attacks ( D’Innocenzo et al., 2016 ). 
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ppendix A. Additional results 
This section of appendix provides the results of analysis of
ome additional characteristics of our primary studies, which are
ot related to CPS security per se, but are still useful to better
nderstand this scientific area. These important characteristics are
he theoretical foundations and time-scale models. 
1. Theoretical foundation 
Because of the intrinsic multidisciplinary nature of cyber-
hysical systems, we paid attention also on the theoretical back-
round on which primary studies are built upon. This information
s particularly useful for the new researchers who would like to
xplore this exciting research area. Since the control systems are
t the heart of CPS, and the provided perspective is that of re-
earchers from the Automatic Control community, it is not a sur-
rise that control theory is used in every study considered in our
apping study. The mapping of other theoretical backgrounds to
ach primary study is provided in the Table 24 . As a reference to
he related application fields, see also Table 3 . 
The study of graphs is the most used theoretical foundation,
ound in 38 studies (27.5%). Graph theory (see e.g. Kleinberg and
ardos, 2006; Bondy and Murty, 1976 ) is well suited to represent
ny kind of topological information, and, in fact, it is used in 29
tudies on security of power transmission networks. 
To asymptotically analyze the intrinsic difficulty of problems
nd algorithms, and to decide which of these are likely to
e tractable, computational complexity theory (see e.g. Horst and
ardalos, 1995; Kleinberg and Tardos, 2006 ) is employed in 16
orks, most of them within the field of power transmission. Information theory (see e.g. Cover and Thomas, 2006 ) is used in
2 works 18 , most of which treating the security of generic linear
ynamical systems. 
The methods of dimensionality reduction (such as principal
omponent analysis) and of latent variable separation (e.g. inde-
endent component analysis) from machine learning and statistics
rovide a way to understand and visualize the structure of com-
lex data sets (see e.g. Lee and Verleysen, 2007 ). They are used
n 7 works, whose application domain is power grids and generic
ynamical systems. 
Other methods of linear dimensionality reduction are used for
imultaneous sensing and compression of finite-dimensional vec-
ors. Providing means for recovering sparse high-dimensional sig-
als from highly incomplete measurements by using efficient algo-
ithms, ( Eldar and Kutyniok, 2012 ), compressed sensing is applied in
 works on power grids and linear dynamical systems. 
Starting from 2014, typical formal methods concepts of sig-
al temporal logic (STL, which is a rigorous formalism for spec-
fying desired behaviors of continuous signals ( Maler and Nick-
vic, 2004 )) and satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) ( Barrett et al.,
009 ) have found their way in 3 studies on CPS security, with ap-
lications to anomaly detection and resilient state estimation in
eneric cyber-physical systems and power grids. 
The mathematical optimization (see e.g. Horst and Pardalos,
995; Rao, 2009 ) is used in several studies and application areas.
he sub-fields of optimization found in primary studies include
onvex optimization (21 studies), linear programming (16 studies),
ynamic programming and integer programming (both appeared in
1 studies), nonlinear programming (6 studies), quadratic program-
ing (adopted in 7 works) and semidefinite programming (3 stud-
es). 
The most used sub-field of game theory , Ba ̧s ar and Ols-
er (1999) , found in 8 primary studies, is zero-sum game, which
o not allow for any cooperation between the players, since what
ne player gains incurs a loss to the other player. As expected, all
onsidered games belong to a class of continuous-time infinite dy-
amic games, also known as differential games , wherein the evo-
ution of the state is described by a differential equation and the
layers act throughout a time interval. 
2. Time-scale model 
The dynamic system behavior can be modeled via different
ime-scale models, such as continuous, discrete and hybrid. In the
ase of the (quasi-)steady state assumption, the system is treated
s (quasi-)static, and the time-scale model is named accordingly.
n particular, quasi-static analysis is mostly chosen for addressing
ontrol architectures like SCADA, which provide steady-state set-
oints to inner control loops. The mapping of each primary study
o related time-scale model is reported in Table 25 , while the re-
ated distribution is shown in Fig. A.30 . 
The quasi-static model is used in 55 studies (39,9%), all but one
 Mo and Sinopoli, 2015 )) of them concerned with power systems
tate estimation, while there are 26 studies (18.8%) considering
ontinuous time, 65 (47.1%) discrete time, and only 5 considering
oth continuous and discrete time, only 3 of which actually using
ybrid time ( Zhu and Ba ̧s ar, 2015; Zhu et al., 2018; Jones et al.,
014 )). 
ppendix B. Threats to validity 
We assessed the level of quality of our study by ap-
lying the quality checklist proposed by Petersen et al. in
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Table 24 
Theoretical foundations. 
Theoretical framework Primary studies 
Compressed sensing Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; 
Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) 
Computational complexity 
theory 
Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Li et al. (2015b) ; 
Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) 
Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Li et al. (2015a) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) 
Control theory Liu et al. (2011, 2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; 
Teixeira et al. (2010) ; Huang et al. (2010) ; Li et al. (2015b) ; Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. 
(2013, 2011) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; 
Bi and Zhang (2014) ; Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; 
Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Hug and Giampapa (2012) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Zonouz et al. (2012) ; 
Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2015a) ; 
Wang et al. (2014) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; 
Yang et al. (2016) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; Li (2014) ; 
Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; 
Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; Tan et al. (2014) ; Amini et al. (2015) ; 
Kim et al. (2015) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) ; 
Anwar et al. (2015) ; Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) ; Gu et al. (2015) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Li et al. (2015a) ; 
Xie et al. (2011) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Bi and 
Zhang (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Amin et al. (2009) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; 
Amin et al. (2010) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) ; 
Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Smith (2015) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; 
Kwon et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2012) ; Xue et al. (2014) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; Zhu et al. (2018) ; 
Shoukry et al. (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013a) ; 
Rhouma et al. (2015) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Chen et al. (2015a) ; 
Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; 
Bai et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; 
Mishra et al. (2015b) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Qi et al. (2015) ; Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; 
Yuan and Mo (2015) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) ; Zhang and Sankar (2015) ; Chen et al. (2015b) ; 
Tang et al. (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Kontouras et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) ; Teixeira et al. (2015a) ; 
Tan et al. (2015) ; Lee et al. (2015) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Convex optimization Kosut et al. (2011) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; Rahman and 
Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Xie et al. (2011) ; Jia et al. (2014) 
Bi and Zhang (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; Amin et al. (2009) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Mo and 
Sinopoli (2015) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) 
Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Dynamic programming Li et al. (2015b) ; Deka et al. (2015a,b) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Amin et al. (2009) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) ; 
Shoukry et al. (2013) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014c) ; Bezzo et al. (2015) 
Formal methods Rahman et al. (2014) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) 
Graph theory Kosut et al. (2011) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013, 2011) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; 
Giani et al. (2013) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Hug and 
Giampapa (2012) ; Wei and Kundur (2015) 
Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and Tong (2013) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; 
Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) ; Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; 
Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; Wang and Ren (2014) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Kim et al. (2015) 
Soltan et al. (2015) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Jia et al. (2014) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Xue et al. (2014) ; 
Zhu et al. (2018) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Zhang and Sankar (2015) 
Integer programming Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Yuan et al. (2012) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; 
Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Pajic et al. (2015) 
Shoukry et al. (2015b) 
Information theory Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Fawzi et al. (2014) ; 
Bai et al. (2015) ; Mishra et al. (2014, 2015b) ; Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) 
Tang et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) 
Linear programming Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Lo and 
Ansari (2013) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2013) 
Bi and Zhang (2013) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Pajic et al. (2015) ; 
Liu et al. (2014c) 
Machine learning and 
statistics 
Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; 
Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Jones et al. (2014) 
Nonlinerar programming Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Li (2014) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Kwon et al. (2014) 
Nonzero-sum (differential) 
game 
Zhu et al. (2018) ; Barreto et al. (2013) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Quadratic programming Kim et al. (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; 
Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) 
Semidefinite programming Amin et al. (2009) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) 
Stackelberg game Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Zero-sum (differential) 
game 
Li et al. (2015b) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Gupta et al. (2010) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; 
Shoukry et al. (2013) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Liu et al. (2014c) 
 
 
 
 
 
t  
i  
i  
a
Petersen et al. (2015) . The goal of Petersen’s quality checklist is to
assess an objective quality rating for systematic mapping studies.
According to the metrics defined in Petersen’s quality checklist, we
achieve an outstanding score of 54%, defined as the ratio of the
number of actions taken in comparison to the total number of ac-ions reported in the quality checklist. The quality score of our study
s far beyond the scores obtained by existing systematic mapping stud-
es in the literature , which have a distribution with a median of 33%
nd 48% as absolute maximum value. 
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Table 25 
Time-scale models. 
time-scale model Primary studies 
Continuous Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2013) ; Hammad et al. (2015b,a) ; Liu et al. (2014b) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; 
Wei and Kundur (2015) ; Nudell et al. (Sept. 2015 ); Amin et al. (2010) ; Smith (2015) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; 
Teixeira et al. (2012) ; Xue et al. (2014) ; Foroush and Martínez (2013) ; Zhu et al. (2018) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) 
Barreto et al. (2013) ; Djouadi et al. (2015) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; Li et al. (2015c) ; Jones et al. (2014) ; 
Bezzo et al. (2015) ; Sajjad et al. (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015a) ; Tan et al. (2015) ; Lee et al. (2015) 
Discrete Huang et al. (2010) ; Li et al. (2015b) ; Tajer et al. (2011) ; Yang et al. (2014) ; Talebi et al. (2010) ; Ozay et al. (2013) ; 
Zonouz et al. (2012) ; Vukovi ́c and Dán (2014) ; Yang et al. (2016) ; Sanandaji et al. (2014) ; Manandhar et al. (2014) ; 
Amini et al. (2015) ; Rawat and Bajracharya (2015) 
Gu et al. (2015) ; Li et al. (2015a) ; Ma et al. (2015) ; Amin et al. (2009) ; Mo et al. (2015) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2012) ; 
Gupta et al. (2010) ; Sundaram et al. (2010) ; Cáardenas et al. (2011) ; Befekadu et al. (2015) ; Zhu and Martínez (2014) ; 
Fawzi et al. (2014) ; Zhu and Ba ̧s ar (2015) ; Teixeira et al. (2015b) ; Kwon et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2012) ; 
Zhu et al. (2018) ; Shoukry et al. (2013) ; D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) ; Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013) ; Kwon and 
Hwang (2013a) ; Rhouma et al. (2015) 
Kwon and Hwang (2013b) ; Miao and Zhu (2014) ; Chen et al. (2015a) ; Tiwari et al. (2014) ; Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) ; 
Pajic et al. (2015) ; Bai et al. (2015) ; Weimer et al. (2014) ; De Persis and Tesi (2015) ; Zhang et al. (2014) ; 
Liu et al. (2014c) ; Bezzo et al. (2014) ; Park et al. (2014) ; Miao et al. (2014) ; Mishra et al. (2014) ; Shoukry and 
Tabuada (2014) ; Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015) ; Mishra et al. (2015b,b) ; Shoukry et al. (2015b) ; Qi et al. (2015) ; 
Kogiso and Fujita (2015) ; Naghnaeian et al. (2015) ; Yuan and Mo (2015) ; Cetinkaya et al. (2015) ; Xu and Zhu (2015) ; 
Chen et al. (2015b) ; Tang et al. (2015) ; Do et al. (2015) ; Kontouras et al. (2015) ; Shoukry et al. (2015a) 
(Quasi-)static Liu et al. (2011) ; Kosut et al. (2011) ; Bobba et al. (2010) ; Hendrickx et al. (2014) ; Teixeira et al. (2010) ; 
Yuan et al. (2012) ; Kim and Poor (2011) ; Pasqualetti et al. (2011) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2011) ; Giani et al. (2013) ; 
Yang et al. (2014) ; Bi and Zhang (2014) ; Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011) ; Davis et al. (2012) ; Sou et al. (2014) ; 
Talebi et al. (2010) ; Vukovi ́c et al. (2012) ; Hug and Giampapa (2012) ; Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) ; Kim and 
Tong (2013) 
Mishra et al. (2015a) ; Wang et al. (2014) ; Valenzuela et al. (2013) ; Lo and Ansari (2013) ; Liu et al. (2014a) ; Sedghi and 
Jonckheere (2015) ; Qin et al. (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014a) ; Deka et al. (2014, 2015a, 2015b) ; Li (2014) ; Wang and 
Ren (2014) ; Liu et al. (2015b) ; Liang et al. (2014) ; Yamaguchi et al. (2014) ; Hao et al. (2015) ; Rahman et al. (2014) ; 
Tan et al. (2014) ; Kim et al. (2015) ; Yu and Chin (2015) ; Soltan et al. (2015) ; Liu et al. (2015a) ; Anwar et al. (2015) ; 
Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015) 
Xie et al. (2011) ; Jia et al. (2014) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2012) ; Choi and Xie (2013) ; Esmalifalak et al. (2013) ; Bi and 
Zhang (2013) ; Kim et al. (2014b) ; Mo and Sinopoli (2015) ; Zhang and Sankar (2015) ; Sanjab and Saad (2015) 
Fig. A1. Distribution of primary studies by time-scale model. 
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s  Overall, the high quality of our study has being ensured by
roducing a detailed research protocol document in which all of
ts steps have been subject to three external reviews by indepen-
ent researchers (see Section 3 ) and by conducting our study by
ollowing the well-accepted and updated guidelines of systematic
eview/mapping study ( Kitchenham and Charters, 2007; Petersen
t al., 2015 ). In the following we detail the main threats to validity
f our study and how we alleviated them. 
Conclusion validity . Conclusion validity refers to the relation-
hip between the extracted data, the produced map, and the re-
ulting findings ( Wohlin et al., 2012 ). 
In order to mitigate possible conclusion validities, first of all we
efined the search terms systematically and we document proce-
ures in our research protocol, so that our research can be repli-
ated by other researchers interested in the topic. Moreover, we
ocumented and used a rigorously defined data extraction form,
o that we could reduce possible biases that may happen during
he data extraction process; also, in so doing we had the guaran-ee that the data extraction process has been consistent to our re-
earch questions. 
On the same line, the classification scheme could have been
nother source of threats to the conclusion validity of our study;
ndeed, other researchers may identify classification schemes with
ifferent facets and attributes. In this context, we mitigated this
ias by (i) performing an external evaluation by independent re-
earchers who were not involved in our research, and (ii) having
he data extraction process conducted by the principle researcher
nd validated by the secondary researcher. 
Internal validity . Internal validity is concerned with the degree
f control of our study design with respect to potential extraneous
ariables influencing the study itself. 
In this case, having a rigorously defined protocol with a rigor-
us data extraction form has surely helped in mitigating biases re-
ated to the internal validity of our research. Also, for what con-
erns the data analysis validity, the threats have been minimal
ince we employed well-assessed descriptive statistics when deal-
ng with quantitative data. When considering qualitative data, the
ensitivity analysis performed on all extracted data has helped in
aving good internal validity. 
Construct validity . It concerns the validity of extracted data
ith respect to our research questions. Construct validity concerns
he selection of the primary studies with respect to how they re-
lly represent the population in light of what is investigated. 
Firstly, as described in Section 3.3 , the automatic search has
een performed on multiple electronic databases to get relevant
tudies independently of publishers’ policies and business con-
erns. Moreover, we are reasonably confident about the construc-
ion of the search string used in our automatic search since the
sed terms have been identified by rigorously applying a system-
tic procedure (i.e., the quasi-gold standard systematic procedure
s defined in Zhang et al. (2011a) ). Moreover, the automatic search
s complemented by the snowballing activity performed during the
earch and selection activity of our review process (see Fig. 1 ), thus
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making us reasonably confident about our search strategy. Since
our automated search strategy actually relies on search engines
quality and on how researchers write their abstracts, the set of pri-
mary selected studies have been extended by means of the back-
ward and forward snowballing procedure. 
After having collected all relevant studies from the auto-
matic search, we rigorously screened them according to well-
documented inclusion and exclusion criteria (see Section 3.4 ); this
selection stage has been performed by the principle researcher, un-
der the supervision of the secondary researcher. Also, in order to
assess the quality of the selection process, both principle and sec-
ondary researchers assessed a random sample of studies, and inter-
researcher agreement has been statistically measured with very
good results (i.e., we obtained a Cohen-Kappa coefficient of inter-
rater agreement of more than 0.80). 
External validity . It concerns the generizability of the produced
map and of the discovered findings ( Wohlin et al., 2012 ). 
In our research, the most severe threat related to external valid-
ity consists in having a set of primary studies that is not represen-
tative of the whole research on security for cyber-physical systems.
In order to mitigate this possible threat, we employed a search
strategy consisting of both automatic search and backward-forward
snowballing of selected studies. Using these two search strategies
in combination empowered us in mitigating this threat to validity.
Also, having a set of well-defined inclusion and exclusion criteria
contributed to reinforcing the external validity of our study. 
A potential source of issues regarding the external validity of
our study can be the fact that only studies published in the En-
glish language have been selected in our search. This decision may
result in a possible threat to validity because potentially important
primary studies published in other languages may have not been
selected in our research. However, the English language is the most
widely used language for scientific papers, so this bias can be rea-
sonably considered as minimal. 
Similarly, grey literature (e.g., white papers, not-peer-reviewed
scientific publications, etc.) is not included in our research; this po-
tential bias is intrinsic to our study design, since we want to focus
exclusively on the state of the art presented in high-quality sci-
entific papers, and thus undergoing a rigorous peer-reviewed pub-
lication process is a well-established requirement for this kind of
scientific works. 
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